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THE SHORTEST DISTANCE: DIRECT FILING AND
CHOICE OF LAW IN MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION
Andrew D. Bradt*
The amount of multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the federal courts is
skyrocketing, particularly in the areas of mass torts and products liability.
One significant reason for the explosion of MDL has been the difficulty of
maintaining nationwide or multistate class actions in these areas, due in
large part to the choice-of-law problems created by operation of many different
states’ laws to plaintiffs’ claims. One comparative benefit of MDL is that
individual cases within the consolidated pretrial proceedings retain their
“choice-of-law identity”—that is, that transfer of a case into a pending MDL
does not change the choice-of-law rules that would otherwise apply to a plaintiff’s case had it proceeded in its original home forum. In other words, the
case carries the choice-of-law rules of the original forum state with it into the
MDL. Because MDL is purportedly a consolidation only for pretrial proceedings, unlike a class action, the application of different choice-of-law rules to
different plaintiffs’ claims does not render the MDL proceeding itself infeasible. This framework, however, is in disarray due to the advent and increasing popularity of a practice called “direct filing.” In direct filing, plaintiffs
bypass the transfer process and file their cases directly into an MDL court.
Amid the growing popularity of this practice, the question of what choice-oflaw rules ought to apply to direct-filed cases has been left unaddressed. This
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paper seeks to expose and resolve the problem by permitting direct filing, but
requiring plaintiffs to declare a proper home district whose choice-of-law rules
would apply to their claims. Such an approach would both preserve the
efficiency benefits of direct filing, and be consistent with the values of federalism and litigant autonomy underlying the choice-of-law framework in diversity cases.

INTRODUCTION
Aggregate litigation and choice of law are poor bedfellows.
Aggregate litigation is driven by the need to resolve many cases efficiently in a single consolidated proceeding by emphasizing the commonalities of cases.1 Choice of law demands attention to the
uniqueness of individual cases, requiring analysis of potentially conflicting state policies and interests in light of the particular circumstances of cases.2 Aggregation seeks sameness, while choice of law
focuses on particularity. When aggregation of cases based on state law
proceeds in a federal court under diversity jurisdiction, the complexity increases. Federal courts sitting in diversity must respect states’
choice-of-law rules because those rules represent states’ choices about
the scope of their laws in cases in which they have regulatory interests,3 and in order to ensure that diversity jurisdiction does not
change the substantive law that would otherwise apply to a plaintiff’s
case.4 As numerous commentators have observed, choice of law matters to the outcomes and values of cases, but it also represents differences in states’ approaches to regulating disputes in which they have
interests.5 For aggregation and choice of law to coexist peacefully,
and to avoid running afoul of these federalism considerations, the
aggregation mechanism must accommodate the individual nature of
cases within the collective. In other words, federal aggregation struc1 See Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10
REV. LITIG. 231 (1991).
2 See Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731,
731–32 (1990).
3 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); see also KERMIT
ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 156 (2009).
4 See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); see also Larry Kramer, Choice of
Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 576 (1996) ( “[T]he mere existence
of federal jurisdiction does not justify modifying the parties’ substantive rights”);
Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
2001, 2034 (2008) (“[A]ggregation should not distort the underlying substantive
rights of the parties”).
5 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 4, at 553–54; Patrick Woolley, Choice of Law and the
Protection of Class Members in Class Suits Certified Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3), 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 799, 833 (2004).
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tures should seek choice-of-law neutrality for the cases within in the
aggregate.
Given these issues, it should come as no surprise, then, that
choice of law has presented a seemingly intractable problem for the
nationwide, diversity-based, mass-tort class action.6 Indeed, the federal courts, where most large class actions are now litigated due to the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),7 have come to a consensus
that the operation of choice-of-law rules demands that different state
laws apply to different plaintiffs within the class, and that those differences render the classes insufficiently cohesive for class certification.8
Calls for federal choice-of-law rules that ensure that a single state’s law
can apply in a nationwide mass-tort case have fallen on deaf ears, in
part because Congress has little interest in facilitating class actions,9
but also because any such rule would raise serious potential federalism
and due-process-related objections.10 Further, in light of the Supreme
Court’s recognition in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.
that a state’s choice-of-law rules are part of its substantive law,11 applying one set of choice-of-law rules to a nationwide set of cases raises
similar federalism problems.12
Although the class-action structure seems increasingly untenable,
the stresses on the system that create the need to aggregate have not
disappeared. Given all this, it should also come as no surprise that
multidistrict litigation, or “MDL,” has stepped in to fill the void.13
6 See Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A Solution to the Choice of Law Problem of
Differing State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374, 374
(2011); Genevieve G. York-Erwin, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action Context,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2009).
7 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in relevant parts at 28 U.S.C.
§§1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2006)).
8 See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Just Choose: The Jurisprudential Necessity to Select a Single
Governing Law for Mass Claims Arising from Nationally Marketed Consumer Goods and Services, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 29, 46–47 (2009) (describing the combination of
CAFA and the choice-of-law problem as the “coup de grâce” for mass-tort class
actions).
9 See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity
and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1941–43 (2006).
10 See Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 10 REV. LITIG. 309, 320 (1991); Silberman, supra note 4, at 2025.
11 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); see also
David F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 732 (1963).
12 Silberman, supra note 4, at 2025–26.
13 See Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245,
2292–95 (2008) (discussing choice-of-law concerns in the context of MDL); Thomas
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The federal MDL statute allows for consolidation of tort cases individually filed around the country for pretrial proceedings in a single district court chosen by a panel of judges. Most cases are ultimately
resolved by the MDL court, but, at least in theory, at the close of pretrial proceedings the individual cases are remanded to the district
courts whence they came.14 Although the MDL statute has been on
the books for over four decades, it has never been as prominent as it is
now. According to recent statistics by the Federal Judicial Center, a
third of all pending federal civil cases are part of an MDL, and over
ninety percent of those cases are products-liability cases—exactly the
sorts of cases that might have been nationwide class actions had
choice-of-law issues not emerged as such a central obstacle.15
Structurally, MDL is a much better fit with choice of law, because
in MDL a high degree of aggregation can be achieved while allowing
cases to retain their individual character. In other words, the MDL
structure fosters aggregation without creating pressure to change the
substantive law that would otherwise apply to cases.16 Cases are filed
around the country in proper venues and transferred into the MDL,
carrying with them the law, and choice-of-law rules, that would have
applied in the districts where the cases were filed.17 Plaintiffs’ substantive rights are formally unchanged due to the existence of a federal
mass-tort proceeding, and states’ interests in resolving disputes their
laws might rationally regulate are vindicated.18 As a result, MDL more
comfortably accommodates the individualized nature of choice-of-law
inquiries and the values those inquiries seek to enforce: the accommodation of interested states’ policies in light of the relevant interests of
the states and of the parties involved in the particular case.
Of course, every case in an MDL does not undergo a rigorous
choice-of-law analysis. Although MDL structurally accommodates
individualized choice-of-law analyses better than does the class action,
E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 776 (2010) (discussing the
substantial growth of aggregate tort litigation in MDL proceedings).
14 See Marcus, supra note 13, at 2265–66.
15 Emery G. Lee, Margaret Williams, Richard A. Nagareda, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas
E. Willging, and Kevin M. Scott, The Expanding Role of Multidistrict Litigation in Federal
Civil Litigation: An Empirical Investigation (2010) at 2 (draft on file with author).
16 See Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class
Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2205–06 (2008).
17 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3866 (3d
ed. 2007).
18 Cf., e.g., Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 820–22 (1985) (arguing that certifying mass-tort proceedings as
class actions can negatively affect a plaintiff’s chance at recovery).
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most MDLs eventually conclude with a global settlement.19 That said,
choice-of-law analyses still matter because MDL courts often apply
state law when deciding dispositive motions and trying bellwether
cases that push the litigation toward settlement.20 Moreover, the
applicable law matters significantly to the value of individual cases and
the group as a whole, particularly in products-liability cases, where
state laws differ significantly.21 The growth of MDL in diversity-based
mass-tort cases is a significant improvement when it comes to animating choice-of-law values in aggregate litigation.
But the growth of MDL is not a panacea for those concerned with
choice of law—rather, it presents problems of its own. The more the
MDL emphasizes the group nature of the litigation over the individual
character of the component cases, the more the conflict between
choice of law and efficiency will resurface. This paper examines in
detail one example of this problem currently causing significant confusion in some of the largest MDLs in the country: the practice of
direct filing. In direct filing, at courts’ encouragement, defendants
agree to allow plaintiffs to file their cases directly into the MDL court,
skipping the steps of filing their cases in an otherwise proper venue
and having the case transferred to the consolidated MDL proceeding.
In most such cases, the MDL court, or the state in which it sits, would
not otherwise be a proper venue for many of these cases, usually due
to lack of jurisdiction over all defendants in all component cases.
Courts encourage these stipulations and enshrine them in case-management orders applicable throughout the entire litigation. Ultimately, this procedure achieves significant efficiencies for all parties
and the system: it reduces costs and delays, eliminates the administrative burdens of transfer on both the parties and the courts, and it
provides the MDL court the ability to try to settle the cases without
ever having the obligation to remand them to their home districts.22
19 See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 270 (2011) (noting MDL “creates the perfect conditions for an
aggregate settlement”).
20 See Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1105, 1150 (2010) (noting bellwether trials’ benefits in pricing claims and providing information to both sides).
21 See, e.g., 2 LOUIS I. FRUMER & MELVIN I FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §25.04
(rev. 2011) (“With the increasing differences from state to state . . . choice of law is
becoming an ever more pertinent and significant aspect of products liability.”).
22 Absent direct filing an MDL court may not try a case transferred to it without
consent of both parties. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,
523 U.S. 26, 34 (1998); see also Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict
Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2324 (2008) (discussing direct filing and bellwether
trials).
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Defendants prefer centralizing all of the cases, and plaintiffs prefer
skipping the transfer step, while preserving their prerogative to return
to a more convenient forum if and when pretrial proceedings conclude. In a sense, direct filing deeply embraces the notion of the
MDL as a single aggregated litigation, as opposed to a temporarily
consolidated collection of individual cases.
Despite these efficiencies, direct filing presents a knotty choiceof-law problem: what state’s choice-of-law rules, and therefore substantive laws, apply to the direct-filed cases? The orders courts have
adopted often say nothing about the choice-of-law implications of
direct filing, and when they do, they usually say that direct filing will
have “no effect” on the applicable law.23 Such stipulations are meaningless because, without an antecedent choice of forum by the plaintiff, it is impossible to determine what choice-of-law rules would have
applied absent direct filing. Direct filing without attention to choice
of law replicates many of the federalism and litigant-autonomy-related
problems of prioritizing efficiency over choice of law. The problem is
both conceptual and currently causing confusion in some of the largest currently pending MDLs.
Most MDL courts have decided to apply the choice-of-law rules of
their own state to direct-filed cases, applying the letter of the rule in
Klaxon—that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choiceof-law rules of the state in which it sits.24 This solution, however, is
conceptually flawed in light of the justifications for Klaxon, namely,
that choice-of-law rules reflect states’ policies as to the scope of their
own law when they have a regulatory interest, and that diversity should
not change the law otherwise applicable in a plaintiff’s case.25 But
recognizing that applying the Klaxon rule does not make sense does
not solve the problem—it can and does create a vacuum, one which a
court might be tempted to fill by selecting choice-of-law rules after the
fact that are unconnected with the forum that might otherwise have
been selected by an individual plaintiff at the outset of a case. Doing
so is potentially prejudicial to a plaintiff who chose to file directly into
the MDL thinking that doing so would have no effect on choice of
law, as promised in most direct-filing orders.
23 See infra Part III.B.
24 See, e.g., In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:08–MD–01928, 2011 WL
1033650, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2011); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d
799, 806 (E.D. La. 2007).
25 See DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 217–18 (1965); see also Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 769–72
(1963) (highlighting the challenges facing a third-party court applying the Klaxon
rule despite the lack of a state interest in the case).
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Ultimately, this paper argues that the appropriate solution to the
choice-of-law problems created by direct filing is for courts to require
that direct-filed cases be governed by the choice-of-law rules of an otherwise proper forum that the plaintiff selects at the outset of her
case.26 Such a solution would ensure that the existence of the MDL
proceeding, and the location of the MDL court, do not change the
law that would otherwise apply to an individual plaintiff’s case. This
solution would also achieve the other underlying goal of Klaxon, to
more often vindicate states’ policy choices regarding the scope of
their own laws in cases where they have a regulatory interest. By
ensuring that an MDL continues to respect the individual character of
the cases within it, the process can best avoid many of the ultimately
insuperable choice-of-law obstacles that faced the class action.
In Part I of the paper, I briefly review the development of the
Supreme Court’s policy regarding choice-of-law and diversity jurisdiction. Although this Part does not canvass the entire array of the
Court’s choice-of-law cases, it examines in detail the Court’s approach
in Klaxon and Van Dusen v. Barrack,27 two cases that still constitute the
foundation of this jurisprudence. In Part II of the paper, I discuss the
shift from class actions in diversity-based mass torts to the MDL and
explain why the traditional MDL framework is a better fit with the
policies underlying Klaxon and Van Dusen than the class action. In
Part III, I focus in detail on direct filing as an example of how, when
MDL strays from its traditional framework, choice-of-law problems
resurface. In that section, I will explain why application of the letter
of Klaxon in these cases conflicts with its policy underpinnings and
examine how departing from Klaxon creates problems of its own. To
do so I will discuss in detail the currently pending MDL involving the
birth-control drug Yaz,28 which has adopted a direct-filing stipulation,
and in which nearly 9,000 of the almost 10,000 pending cases have
been directly filed.29 The problems in the Yaz litigation illustrate well
the problems created by direct filing. In Part IV of the paper, I will
sketch out a potential solution to the direct-filing dilemma that seeks
26 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006) (setting forth the process by which civil actions
can be transferred to an MDL court, although remaining silent on direct file actions).
27 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
28 In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 3:09–md–02100–DRH–PMF. MDL No. 2100, 2011 WL 1375011 (S.D. Ill.
Apr. 12, 2011).
29 Letter from Catlin Fischer, Managing Clerk, to author, In re Yasmin, MDL No.
2100 (Aug. 9, 2012) (on file with author); Letter from Catlin Fischer, Managing
Clerk, to author, In re Yasmin, MDL No. 2100 (July 25, 2011) (on file with author).
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to comply better with the policies underlying the Supreme Court’s
choice-of-law-federalism jurisprudence.
Examining the complications direct filing creates, and presenting
a solution that seeks to preserve otherwise rational choice-of-law analysis in individual cases, aims to shed some light more broadly on the
interaction of federalism, choice of law, and efficiency in aggregate
litigation, and present an example of a solution that provides an
appropriate balance of these often conflicting considerations.
I. CHOICE-OF-LAW FEDERALISM

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

A. The Supreme Court’s Choice-of-Law Jurisprudence Prior to Klaxon
The years prior to the 1941 decision in Klaxon were ones of significant change with respect to the Court’s approach to choice of law. In
the early part of the twentieth century, the Court weighed in often on
choice-of-law questions,30 reviewing decisions by both federal and
state courts under the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Clauses.31 The Court’s view—that choices between conflicting states’
laws were narrowly cabined by the Constitution—was consistent with
the then-prevailing dogma. At the time, adherence to the territorially
based “vested rights” view of choice of law, most often associated with
Professor Joseph H. Beale and his First Restatement of Conflict of
Laws, was near universal. The “vested rights” theory held that a plaintiff’s legal rights “vested” at a particular moment under the law of a
state in which a single connecting event occurred, such as the place of
the injury in tort, or the place of the making of a contract.32 Under
this theory, departing from the law of the state where such a key event
occurred implicated significant concerns about both the parties’ dueprocess rights and the legislative jurisdiction of the state whose law
seemingly undoubtedly applied to a particular dispute.33 The key pur30 See James Y. Stern, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. L. REV.
1509, 1510 (2008).
31 See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head,
234 U.S. 149 (1914); see generally PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 3.21-3.24
(5th ed. 2010) (describing the evolution of the Court’s conflicts jurisprudence as
relating to due process and full faith and credit issues).
32 See generally Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23
HARV. L. REV. 260, 271 (1910) (evaluating different theories of what law should govern contracts and concluding that the law of the place of the making of a contract
provides the best option).
33 For a restatement of the vested-rights doctrine and its connection to the
Court’s choice-of-law jurisprudence, see RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9.1, at 654 (6th ed. 2010) (“[F]or a time the Supreme Court did
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ported virtue of this framework was uniformity—under it, there was
supposedly only one “correct” answer to every conflicts problem.34
But by the 1930s, according to the now-familiar story of the
“choice-of-law revolution,” the territorial underpinnings of the vestedrights doctrine began to crumble.35 Thanks to trenchant criticism by
numerous academics, most forcefully Walter Wheeler Cook and David
Cavers,36 it became clear that the vested-rights approach had significant theoretical and practical problems. Strict application of the doctrine often led to arbitrary and unfair results,37 and for that reason,
courts regularly refused to apply it, instead using a variety of “escape
devices,” such as the public-policy exception to applying foreign law,
to avoid harsh application of the rules.38 These critiques generated
widespread dissatisfaction with traditional choice-of-law doctrine, and
prompted rethinking. The so-called “revolution” had begun.39
Although the new “modern” approaches to choice of law differed
from one another in significant ways, they shared the position that
several states’ laws could rationally apply to a multistate dispute.
Choosing among possibly applicable laws required examination of the
policies underlying those laws and the relation of those policies to the
facts of individual cases.40 Instead of there being one unassailable
answer to every choice-of-law question, the prevailing view became, as
Paul Freund described it, that “there are at least two possibly applicaattempt to translate rigid territorial choice-of-law dogmas into equally rigid constitutional dogmas.”).
34 Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 2448, 2457 (1999) (noting that for Beale, “given his territorial understanding . . .
laws cannot even come into contact with each other, much less conflict”).
35 See generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION
11 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the flaws in choice-of-law jurisprudence an the ensuing
“revolution”).
36 See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE L.J. 457 (1924); David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV.
L. REV. 173 (1933).
37 See Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1989); Arthur
Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927,
930 (1975).
38 See Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law,
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 208 (noting that commentators examined the exceptions to
the traditional rule and “began to question . . . whether they indicated the need for
an altogether different understanding of sovereignty”).
39 See Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631,
1631 (2005) (describing the “revolution”: “the old formalistic way of choosing law was
dethroned, and has occupied a humble position on the sidelines ever since”).
40 See generally WEINTRAUB, supra note 33, § 1.5, at 7–15 (discussing the policybased approaches that flourished during the choice-of-law revolution).
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ble rules or systems of law in a multistate problem. Choice is inescapable and must be explicit.”41 This shift reflected the realization
that the purpose of choice of law was not to seek uniformity alone, but
to “understand, harmonize, and weigh competing interests in multistate events.”42
By the late 1930s, the Court, too, was more often wavering from
traditional conflicts doctrine.43 In several opinions by Justice Stone,
the Court turned away from the vested-rights approach in favor of the
position that multiple laws might apply in a given case. Given that
there were admittedly multiple plausible answers to most choice-of-law
questions, the scope of the Supreme Court’s review of state courts’
choice-of-law decisions would be much more limited.44 Perhaps most
indicative of this shift was Justice Stone’s opinion for the Court in
Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission of California.45 In that case, rather than looking for a dispositive factual connection to a particular state, or the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of
one state over torts or contracts occurring within its borders, the
Court, strikingly, stated that “the conflict is to be resolved . . . by
appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to their weight.”46
In short, the Court’s approach in Alaska Packers and other contemporaneous cases,47 in Professor Freund’s words, established that,
“[w]ithin limits, there is room for assertiveness as well as reticence in
the family of our states. What those limits are must be determined by
appraising the interests of the states.”48 The Court’s more flexible
approach to constitutional limits on choice of law therefore signaled
two key developments: the acknowledgement that the strict rules of
41 Paul A. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210,
1210 (1946).
42 Id. at 1235–36.
43 See ROOSEVELT III, supra note 34, at 116 (noting that by the 1930s the Court
began to note “the tensions within the original system, which the erosion of territoriality threw into sharper relief”).
44 See Freund, supra note 41, at 1214 (noting that Justice Stone’s opinions began
“renouncing a geographical test in favor of a teleological one in the choice of law.
Not place but purpose was decisive.”).
45 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
46 Id. at 547.
47 See, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 500
(1939) (holding multiple laws may constitutionally apply to a multistate dispute).
48 Freund, supra note 41, at 1222. See also id. at 1225 (contending that Alaska
Packers and Pacific Employers “have left great latitude to the states in choice of law”);
Weinberg, supra note 39, at 1635 (stating that the “Court began to see that both states
[in a conflicts case] might have constitutional power” as evidenced by Alaska Packers).
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the vested-rights doctrine were not constitutionally mandated, and
that the Supreme Court would not rigidly police states’ choices with
regard to the application of their own law in cases in which they had a
regulatory interest.49 As a result, the Court exhibited a high degree of
tolerance for different decisions by state courts in choice of law, a
move which made sense given the changes in the choice-of-law field
generally.50
B. Erie and Klaxon
Not to reverse the two in order of importance, but prior to Klaxon
came Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,51 which, as Richard Marcus
describes it, “looms over all federal adjudication.”52 I will dispense
with the familiar story of Erie, except to note two aspects of the case:
that, first, Erie emphasizes the unfairness of different results in the
federal and state courts of the same state based on the accident of
diversity, and, second, that Erie, even on its most conservative reading,
prohibits the federal courts from making law beyond the lawmaking
power of the Congress.53
Prior to Erie, choice of law was considered a matter of federal
common law in diversity cases.54 After Erie, it was an open question
whether federal courts sitting in diversity would be required to apply
state choice-of-law rules.55 Eventually, the circuits split,56 and the
49 See Weinberg, supra note 39, at 1637 (discussing the “liberating insight” of the
“innovative Supreme Court cases of the 1930s” that “in a two-state case in tort, the law
chosen did not have to be the law of the place of injury . . . nor, indeed, [of] any other
single place”).
50 The Court’s tolerance has not abated. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302 (1981).
51 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
52 Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 693 (1984).
53 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION
(2000) (discussing Erie and its justifications).
54 See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27
(1963).
55 The Court could have addressed the issue contemporaneously with Erie, but it
explicitly left the question open in an opinion released the same day. See Ruhlin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 208 n.2 (1938).
56 In Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 761 (1st Cir. 1940), the First Circuit held
that Erie required fidelity to state choice-of-law rules. In his iconic opinion, Judge
Magruder opined that if a federal court could ignore state choice-of-law rules, “then
the ghost of Swift v. Tyson still walks abroad, somewhat shrunken in size, yet capable of
much mischief.” Id. (citation omitted).
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Supreme Court took up the matter in 1941 in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co.57
Klaxon was a breach-of-contract case brought in the District of
Delaware. Stentor, a New York corporation, sued Klaxon, a Delaware
corporation, on a contract made in New York. Stentor won at trial,
and then moved for prejudgment interest.58 Stentor had not, prior to
that point, requested interest, nor had it asked the court to charge the
jury on that question. Instead, Stentor argued that it was entitled to
interest under a New York statute which made the addition of interest
mandatory in breach-of-contract actions.59 The district court agreed,
holding that New York law governed the contract as a matter of federal conflicts law.60 Klaxon appealed, arguing that the New York
interest statute should not apply. Instead, Klaxon contended that federal law should apply to the question because the case was in federal
court, and that as a matter of federal procedural law, Stentor was not
entitled to interest because it had not moved for it before the case
went to the jury.61
The Third Circuit affirmed, also apparently following federal
common law of choice of law.62 Citing only treatises, the court held
that under “the better view of the law,” in a breach-of-contract case the
availability of prejudgment interest should be decided according to
the law of the place of a contract’s performance.63 Applying that
57 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
58 Id. at 494–95.
59 Id. at 495 (citing N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 480 (1925 N.Y. Laws 173–74)).
60 Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 30 F. Supp. 425, 432–35 (D. Del. 1939).
61 Klaxon based its position on a Second Circuit case authored by Judge Learned
Hand, Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro v. C.G. Blake Co., 34 F.2d 616 (2d Cir.
1929).
62 Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 115 F.2d 268, 275–77 (3d Cir. 1940).
63 Id. at 275–76. There is reason to question whether this is the correct interpretation of the Third Circuit’s opinion. It is true that the Third Circuit never cited
Delaware authority in deciding that New York law governed. But there is reason to
believe that the Third Circuit thought it was following Delaware conflicts rules.
The writer of the opinion, Judge Goodrich, had authored a prominent conflicts
treatise. He published a second edition of that treatise in 1938, after Erie, in which he
opined that “today the federal courts have no independent rules of common law and
therefore Conflict of Laws, but must follow the rules established in the state courts of
their district.” HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 24 (2d
ed. 1938). Moreover, Judge Goodrich found this result “proper and desirable; it prevents a difference in decision depending on whether suit is brought in the state or
federal courts, and one more possibility of divergence based upon the fortuitous
event of the forum chosen has been abolished.” Id. The Supreme Court cited this
passage in its Klaxon opinion. 313 U.S. at 496 n.2.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL205.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 13

the shortest distance

4-FEB-13

12:48

771

choice-of-law rule, the court decided that New York’s interest statute
applied to Stentor’s claim.64
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.65 Although Klaxon
continued to argue that the question of prejudgment interest was a
matter of federal procedural law,66 the Court framed the case exclusively as a choice between the Delaware and New York laws governing
prejudgment interest. The Court found that the Third Circuit’s decision, made “without regard to Delaware law,” ran afoul of Erie.67 Justice Reed, writing for the Court, stated that “the prohibition declared
in Erie, against any such independent determinations by the federal
courts, extends to the field of conflict of laws.”68 As a result, “[t]he
Additionally, the other two judges on the Stentor Third Circuit panel, Judges
Maris and Jones, decided a case only a month after Stentor, in which Jones wrote for a
unanimous panel that in “effectuation of the policy of federal jurisprudence enunciated in Erie, it would seem proper for a federal court to follow the rule of the State of
the forum on a question of conflict of laws.” Waggaman v. Gen. Fin. Co., 116 F.2d
254, 257 (3d Cir. 1940) (citation omitted). For this proposition, the Waggaman panel
cited none other than their colleague Judge Goodrich and his treatise. Id.
Given all this, there is credence to an argument that the Third Circuit in Stentor
was applying Delaware conflicts law. The opinion, though, is unclear. It first decides
that prejudgment interest is a matter of substance and not procedure, citing the
Restatement, and treatises by Goodrich and Beale. Stentor, 115 F.2d at 275–76. As a
result, the law of the place of performance of the contract, New York, applied. In
theory, if the court were applying federal common law, its work would be done. But
then, oddly, the court went on to assess the “further difficult question whether the
New York statute above referred to is a matter of substance to be included as a proper
part of the reference to New York law in this case, or whether it is simply a regulation
of procedure in the New York courts. This question the court at the forum must
determine.” Id. at 276. The court inserted a footnote to the Restatement, stating that
“[t]he court at the forum determines according to its own Conflict of Laws rule
whether a given question is one of substance or procedure.” Id. n.6 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 584 (1934)). The court then proceeded to state
that, “[i]t seems to us that the statute, in the Conflict of Laws sense, at any rate, is
substantive and that reference to it is rightfully included.” Stentor, 115 F.2d at 276.
Again, no mention of Delaware.
In any event, in light of the lack of clarity of the opinion and the necessity to
address the conflicts issue after Erie, the questions surrounding the Third Circuit’s
conclusion are essentially academic, but it is ironic that Judge Goodrich, one of the
earliest proponents of what would ultimately become the Klaxon rule, would be
reversed in this manner.
64 Stentor, 115 F.2d at 276.
65 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 498 (1941).
66 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Klaxon, 313 U.S. 487 (No. 741), at 7 (“[I]t is
essential that the federal courts have a uniform choice-of-law rule regarding
interest.”).
67 Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
68 Id. (citation omitted).
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conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware
must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.”69 A different conclusion would “do violence to the principle of uniformity
within a state, upon which the Tompkins decision is based.”70 If a federal court could craft its own choice-of-law rules, “the accident of
diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration
of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side.”71
Justice Reed also responded to the argument that requiring federal courts to abide by state choice-of-law rules would create intolerable disuniformity among federal courts:
Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal
courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which
leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the
right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors.
It is not for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent “general law” of conflict of laws.72

As the Court ultimately concluded, “the proper function of the
Delaware federal court is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it
ought to be.”73 Citing its recent choice-of-law opinions, the Court
held that Delaware was free to decide that its choice-of-law rules mandated application of Delaware law to a Delaware corporate defendant
if the New York law “would interfere with its local policy.”74 As a
result, the Court reversed and remanded to the lower courts to decide
what Delaware’s choice-of-law rules would dictate.75
The Supreme Court’s brief opinion in Klaxon has its flaws. For
one thing, the Court ignored the first step of the analysis on which
Klaxon had based its case: the “vertical” choice-of-law question of
whether the issue of prejudgment interest is substantive or procedural
as a matter of federal law, a question like those that would demand
the court’s attention soon thereafter in other Erie-progeny cases.76
Second, the Court never made clear whether Klaxon’s rule is constitu69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 497.
74 Id. at 498.
75 Id. Essentially, Klaxon “won” reversal based on Stentor’s argument. The Court
rejected Klaxon’s position that federal choice-of-law rules should govern, and
accepted Stentor’s position that a federal court is compelled to follow the choice-oflaw rules of the state in which it sits.
76 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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tionally based, statutorily based, or simply a rule of federal common
law itself.77
Despite its flaws, however, the Klaxon opinion’s holding and rationale were clear and consistent with both Erie and the Court’s new
choice-of-law jurisprudence. The Court promulgated a clear rule: a
federal court sitting in diversity must follow the choice-of-law rules of
the state in which it sits. And the justifications for this rule were also
apparent. First, the Court recognized that choice-of-law rules significantly affect the results of the cases, and that it would be inconsistent
with Erie for those rules to be different in federal and state court due
to the “accident of diversity.”78 Second, in the new world where multiple states’ laws could rationally govern in a single case, such questions
were matters of state policy that federal courts were not to “thwart.”79
Klaxon, therefore, recognizes that states can and will differ on questions of choice of law as a matter of policy, and that federal courts
must respect those differences. Klaxon’s policy goes beyond diver77 Most commentators argue, and I tentatively agree, that the Klaxon rule is not
constitutionally required because it is within Congress’s power to make rules for cases
involving multiple states. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1938 (“There should be no
question at all that, in the absence of such uniform federal statutory law, Congress has
constitutional power to prescribe choice of law rules specifying the states whose laws
shall govern [interstate] activities.”); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 402 (1964) (“[T]he constitutional
basis of Erie does not apply to choice of law issues even when diversity is the sole basis
of federal jurisdiction and a fortiori when it is not.”). John Hart Ely thought that
Klaxon was required by the Rules of Decision Act. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 714 n.125 (1974). Kermit Roosevelt contends that
Klaxon is at least in a “limited sense . . . constitutionally grounded.” ROOSEVELT, supra
note 3, at 158.
What the Supreme Court thought was the “source” of the Klaxon rule remains
unclear. Justice Reed famously concurred separately in Erie, rejecting Justice Brandeis’s constitutional justification in favor of overruling Swift v. Tyson solely on the
basis of the Rules of Decision Act. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 90–92 (1938)
(Reed, J., concurring) (rejecting majority opinion “in so far as it relies upon the
unconstitutionality” of Swift). In Klaxon, the portion of Erie that Reed cites is only the
part of Brandeis’s opinion discussing the “defects, political and social” of Swift, and
not the constitutional justification for the opinion. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496 (citing
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–77). Edward Purcell’s work reveals that Reed’s hostility to Erie’s
constitutional underpinning was based on his belief that the federal courts could constitutionally provide rules of decision, particularly in procedure. PURCELL, supra note
53, at 104–07. There is, then, at least some suggestion that the Court did not consider
Klaxon of constitutional stature.
78 Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. This policy was better elaborated by Judge Magruder
in Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1940), which the Supreme Court cited approvingly in Klaxon. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496 n.2 (citing Sampson, 110 F.2d at 759–62).
79 Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
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sity—it suggests that state choices on conflicts in cases where its regulatory interests are implicated are to be respected as part of our
federal system.
Klaxon has never been very popular. In fact, despite the unanimity of the Supreme Court, numerous prominent scholars have criticized the opinion, including the likes of Charles E. Clark and Henry
Hart,80 among others.81 Criticism of the opinion has not abated since
1941,82 but the Supreme Court has remained steadfast in its support
for Klaxon.83 And Congress has never overruled it by statute, despite
numerous opportunities.84 It is not my purpose here to relitigate
Klaxon; that debate has been well-ventilated.85 That said, I agree with
the result. In particular, I am persuaded by the Court’s conclusion
that a state’s choice-of-law rules are part of a state’s substantive law
and represent policy decisions as to the scope of that state’s laws, and
federal courts should not change those rules in diversity cases.86 To
do so would contravene the underlying policy of Erie.
In this regard, I find most persuasive David Cavers’s work in
response to Henry Hart, perhaps Klaxon’s harshest critic. As Edward
80 Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 285–87 (1946); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 514 n.86 (1954).
81 See, e.g., 5 WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 136 (1942) (criticizing the view adopted in Klaxon); Donald T. Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice of Law and Federal Common Law, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 120 n.58 (1977) (criticizing Klaxon for reintroducing uncertainty into the choice of law determination); Baxter, supra note 54, at 31–33 (criticizing the Klaxon decision and noting that the holding did not even make a “cursory
reference to the language, history, or purpose of the Rules of Decision Act.”).
82 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal
Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 82 (1993)
(describing Klaxon as “manifestly inconvenient” and noting its decreased ability to
prevent forum-shopping over time); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal
Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991).
83 See Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (reaffirming
Klaxon); see also Gene R. Shreve, Conflicts Law—State or Federal?, 68 IND. L.J. 907, 910
n.20 (1993) (noting the Supreme Court has “not wavered” in affirming the Klaxon
rule).
84 See Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Choice of Law, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 12, 22 (2009) (“It does not seem likely that Congress will be interested in adopting a federal choice-of-law code . . . .”); see also Silberman, supra note 4, at 2005–07
(discussing the uncertainty surrounding the application of Klaxon to CAFA).
85 For the terms of the Klaxon debate, see RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 564–69 (6th ed. 2009).
86 My views are similar to those of Professor Roosevelt in this regard. See
ROOSEVELT, supra note 3, at 156.
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Purcell has noted, Hart “despised Klaxon.”87 In essence, Hart’s primary criticism was that the federal courts should be allowed to make
choice-of-law rules in diversity cases because they “are in a peculiarly
disinterested position to make a just determination as to which state’s
laws ought to apply where this is disputed.”88 Hart’s position was that
federal common law of choice of law in diversity cases would eventually lead to uniform rules and would prevent interstate forum shopping, a problem he deemed worse than intrastate forum shopping
because of plaintiffs’ ability to affect choice of law through the choice
of forum.89
Cavers defended Klaxon primarily on the ground that a state’s
choice-of-law rules were an expression of state policy about the reach
and strength of its law, and the state’s conception of its relationship
with other states.90 The notion of needing the federal government as a
disinterested umpire “places a low estimate on the importance of state
autonomy in determining the reach of state law.”91 In Cavers’s view,
the federal-umpire approach granted federal courts under the diversity jurisdiction a “veto power over state assertions of interest in
choice-of-law situations.”92
This defense of Klaxon was consistent with the choice-of-law
revolution:
[I]f the basic task of the courts in a choice-of-law case is not to apply
broad jurisdiction-selecting rules that ignore the content of the
87 PURCELL, supra note 53, at 251. Hart went so far as to deliver a speech before
the Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit in 1958 called Klaxon Delendum Est.
88 Hart, supra note 80, at 515. Walter Wheeler Cook agreed with this view,
though more tentatively. COOK, supra note 81, at 136 (“Very possibly national courts
may take a broader, a less parochial, view of these matter than state courts.”).
89 PURCELL, supra note 53, at 249–53. These views were of a piece with Hart’s
general views of Erie and York. See also Burbank, supra note 9, at 1940 (detailing complaints and defenses of Klaxon from several professors).
90 David F. Cavers, Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon
Problem, Memorandum for the American Law Institute Study of Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, at 156 (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 30, 1963)
(“A state choice-of-law rule, whether judge-made or statutory, is a determination of
the reach of the state policy embodied in the state law chosen by the rule. Diversity
jurisdiction should not be used by the federal courts as a means of curtailing or
extending that reach.”). Hart and Cavers were on the Harvard Law School faculty,
and there were “numerous occasions” when the two “shared classes to debate Klaxon.”
Cavers, supra note 11, at 735 n.12.
91 CAVERS, supra note 25, at 217.
92 Cavers, supra note 11, at 736. Conversely, a federal court should not override
when “the courts of the forum state might well have thought it wiser not to extend
their own state’s law to an out-of-state event or transaction, even though there were
sufficient connections with the forum state to justify its application.” Id. at 737.
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state laws chosen but rather to identify state policies and to determine the significance for those policies of their application or nonapplication in interstate situations, then the most appropriate
forum for the performance of this task is a court of a state whose
policies are in issue.93

Ultimately, so long as a state’s choices complied with the appropriately loose strictures of the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Clauses, it was improper for the federal courts, under diversity jurisdiction, to override constitutional state decisions on such matters.
Although states might differ as to the answer in a particular case, and
such an answer might be parochial, Cavers concluded that these
“chronic differences . . . reflect genuine differences in values. Moreover, I doubt that there is any supra-state hierarchy of values which
would justify the federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction in overriding one state’s strongly-held values in favor of another’s as long as
constitutional limits on state power were respected.”94 A state’s decision about the scope of its laws are as much a part of that state’s substantive law as standards of liability or requirements of a valid
contract, and a federal court, under Erie, may no more depart from
one than the other.95
Besides his defense of state choice-of-law rules, Cavers opposed
federal choice-of-law rules on their own merits. Pre-Erie history, when
choice of law was a matter of common law in the federal courts, had
demonstrated that uniformity had not developed, and such uniformity was even less likely to develop in the current climate of upheaval in
choice of law and a likely lack of appetite on the Supreme Court’s part
to resolve choice-of-law circuit splits.96 Moreover, Cavers feared that if
Congress or the courts sought to establish choice-of-law rules, the
desire to reduce uncertainty would lead them toward the “lowest common denominator,” enshrining the traditional rules of the First
93 Cavers, supra note 90, at 165; see also id. at 191 (“[R]ecognition of the fact that
a state’s choice-of-law rules may throw light on the reach and strength of its substantive policies”).
94 Cavers, supra note 90, at 166.
95 Id.; see also Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 345 (1960) (“[A] state court’s construction of a state
statute, determining how that statute is to be applied to cases having foreign aspects,
is parcel of the statute, and is as much to be respected in federal courts as any other
construction by the state courts.”); Russell J. Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State
Conflict of Laws Rules, 39 IND. L.J. 228, 242 (1963) (“[T]he choice-of-law rules of a state
are important expressions of its domestic policy.”).
96 CAVERS, supra note 25, at 221 n.40 (describing likely circuit splits and the
unlikelihood that the Supreme Court would “clog its docket with private litigation
involving choice-of-law questions”).
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Restatement, rather than the policy-based techniques of modern
approaches.97 And, unless any federal choice-of-law rules were binding on the states, separate choice systems in the federal and state
courts would expand opportunities for forum shopping, and replicate
the pre-Erie problem of courts across the street from one another
reaching different results.98 Indeed, Cavers, like the Klaxon Court, was
willing to accept “ample freedom” for interstate forum shopping, but
refused on Erie grounds to accept intra-state forum shopping.99
C. Van Dusen v. Barrack
One dilemma for the Klaxon doctrine emerged in 1948 when
Congress passed the federal transfer statute.100 The statute, which
effectively replaced the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the federal
courts for domestic cases, allowed cases to be transferred to another
district where the case might have been brought for the convenience
of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. Klaxon, of
course, required that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the
choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. The passage of the
transfer statute posed a problem: if a case is transferred from one
federal district to another, what state’s choice-of-law rules should the
transferee court follow?101
The facts of 1964’s Van Dusen v. Barrack102 posed the problem
starkly, and, importantly for this discussion, did so “against the backdrop of an alleged mass tort.”103 Van Dusen involved the crash of an
airplane which had taken off in Boston and was bound for Philadelphia, but landed in Boston Harbor. The crash spawned over 150
actions for personal injury and wrongful death.104 Some 100 of these
actions were brought in the District of Massachusetts, where the flight
took off and crashed, while 45 others were brought in the Eastern
97 Id. at 222 (“What the new freedom of the federal courts would bring would not
be a new set of normative principles or a discriminating effort to narrow the issues in
choice-of-law cases but a nostalgic search for a doctrinal lowest common
denominator.”).
98 Id.; see also Cavers, supra note 90, at 158 (“If the sequel to the abolition of
Klaxon were to be a long and possibly never-ending period in which federal choice-oflaw rules would lack uniformity and certainty, a litigant’s opportunity to play for
advantageous choice-of-law rules by the choice of a federal court instead of a state
court within the same state would be greatly enhanced.”).
99 Cavers, supra note 11, at 740.
100 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006).
101 See Currie, supra note 95, at 348 (describing the problem as “insoluble”).
102 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
103 Id. at 613.
104 Id. Interestingly, the crash was caused by a “bird strike.”
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District of Pennsylvania, where the flight was supposed to land.105
Venue and jurisdiction were appropriate in Pennsylvania,106 but the
defendants sought to have the Pennsylvania wrongful-death cases
transferred to the District of Massachusetts, where most of the other
cases were pending and more of the witnesses and evidence were
located.107
The problem was created by diverging state law and choice-of-law
rules. Under Massachusetts law, these plaintiffs could not maintain
their wrongful-death suits because they had not complied with Massachusetts law requiring that foreign wrongful-death plaintiffs acquire
an appointment as a personal representative before filing suit. Pennsylvania law did not require such an appointment.108 As the Court
framed the problem, if Massachusetts law applied, these plaintiffs
were out of court, but if Pennsylvania law applied, the cases could
proceed.109 Moreover, Massachusetts law sharply limited the damages
available to plaintiffs in wrongful-death suits, compared to Pennsylvania laws.110 Observing that changing the applicable law due to a
transfer might render the transfer motion “tantamount to a motion to
dismiss,” that Court found that “the potential prejudice to the plaintiffs is so substantial as to require review of the assumption that a
change of state law would be a permissible result of transfer.”111
The Court, therefore, dealt squarely with the question whether,
in a mass tort, the convenience of consolidating proceedings in a single federal court could work to deprive plaintiffs of the state-law benefits of their choice of forum. To this question, the Court answered,
plainly, no: so long as plaintiffs’ original choice was a proper venue,
the mechanics of aggregation could not work to defeat a plaintiff’s
choice of forum.112 So, the Court held, the transfer statute should be
regarded as a “housekeeping measure,” resulting in a “change of
courtrooms,” but not a change of law.113
105 Id. at 614.
106 Id. at 617 n.6.
107 Id. at 614.
108 Id. at 616.
109 Id. at 625.
110 Id. at 626–28.
111 Id. at 630.
112 Id. at 633–34. The decision suggested it would “allow plaintiffs to retain
whatever advantages may flow from the state laws of the forum they have initially
selected. There is nothing, however, in the language or policy of § 1404(a) to justify
its use by defendants to defeat the advantages accruing to plaintiffs who have chosen a
forum which, although it was inconvenient, was a proper venue.”
113 Id. at 636–37.
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Importantly, the Court also recognized the tension between its
decision in Van Dusen and the rule of Klaxon: under the Van Dusen
rule, a transferee court would be applying the choice-of-law rules of
the transferor court, not the transferee court’s home state. In the
Court’s view, however, the policy underlying Klaxon and Erie warranted an exception from the letter of the Klaxon rule. Applying the
Klaxon rule strictly to a transferee court would “enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which could not have
been achieved in the courts of the State where the action was filed”
and therefore change the result of the case based on the ‘accident’ of
federal diversity jurisdiction.”114
In sum, Van Dusen reaffirmed the Klaxon principle that state
choice-of-law rules are to be respected, and also established that a
plaintiff’s inclusion in mass-tort litigation should not deprive that
plaintiff of the benefits of his choice of a proper forum.115 Although
Van Dusen did not formally involve an aggregation tool, and the decision was several years before the passage of the MDL statute, the result
of the transfers would have been to consolidate the litigation in a single federal district. Van Dusen suggests that mass-tort litigation does
not warrant a change in state choice-of-law rules, particularly when
doing so would prejudice the plaintiff—a view that prizes litigant
autonomy at the expense of aggregation.116 Indeed, Van Dusen anticipated the persuasive view of numerous modern scholars, most prominently Larry Kramer and Linda Silberman, who would argue the same
thing, on the ground that choice-of-law rules define a plaintiff’s right
to recovery, and there is nothing about inclusion in a mass-tort pro114 Id. at 638 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115 Currie ultimately agreed with Van Dusen, though he had originally taken the
opposite view, arguing that in transfer cases, federal courts should develop a common
law of choice of law. Currie abandoned that view because federal choice-of-law rules
intruded improperly on state prerogatives. Currie, supra note 95, at 345–46.
The Court extended Van Dusen to situations where the plaintiff moves for transfer
in Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990). Although fully entering the Ferens fray
is beyond the scope of this paper, I believe it was wrongly decided. My view is that
Ferens, by allowing plaintiffs to file in one far-flung forum and seek a transfer, allows a
result unattainable in state courts—the ability to achieve both a nearby forum and a
distant forum’s choice-of-law rules. As a matter of Klaxon policy, Ferens is also questionable because it allows a state without legislative jurisdiction to have personal jurisdiction over a case, even though that state has no interest in applying its law. My
critique of that phenomenon—more a critique of overbroad personal jurisdiction
than Ferens—is also beyond the scope of this paper.
116 This view is echoed in the work of Roger H. Trangsrud. See, e.g., Roger H.
Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 821
(1985).
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ceeding that ought to prejudice those underlying rights.117 The ALI
has also come around to this view in its recent Principles of Aggregate
Litigation.118
In sum, Klaxon and Van Dusen together represent a coherent policy, that states’ choice-of-law rules represent a state’s substantive decision on the scope of its law, and diversity jurisdiction does not warrant
departure from those rules. Moreover, the invocation of a state’s
choice-of-law rules is linked to a plaintiffs’ selection of a proper venue.
Transfer within the federal system—even in the case of a mass tort,
where transfer would create increased efficiency—does not deprive a
plaintiff of the benefits of that choice. With this backdrop in mind, I
will turn to the complications that the Klaxon/Van Dusen policy represents for federal aggregate litigation.
II. MASS TORT MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

AND

CHOICE

OF

LAW

In this section, I briefly describe how the policies underlying
Klaxon and Van Dusen present a thorn in the side of aggregate litigation of mass torts. While aggregation seeks to make the claims of individual plaintiffs throughout the country more alike—so as to facilitate
better litigating their cases as a group—the policies respecting differences in state laws and plaintiff’s forum choices pull the other way,
inhibiting aggregation by emphasizing the differences among plaintiffs’ cases. Ultimately, one way to explain the problems choice of law
has presented for class actions, leading to the resulting shift to multidistrict litigation, is to note that the class action overemphasized
aggregation at the expense of federalism and litigant autonomy.
MDL, for its part, still provides a high degree of aggregation—and
some would argue too high—but also is more compatible with
respecting differences in state law and litigant autonomy, at least with
respect to choice of law.

117 See Kramer, supra note 4, at 572 (“If the reason for consolidating is to make
adjudication of the parties’ rights more efficient and effective, then the fact of consolidation itself cannot justify changing those rights. To let it do so is truly to let the tail
wag the dog.”); Silberman, supra note 4, at 2034 (“The procedural tools of aggregation should not distort the underlying substantive rights of the parties. Courts should
approach choice of law as they would in the paradigm individual case.”).
118 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.05 cmt. a (2010).
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A. The “Choice-of-Law Problem” in Class Actions
The so-called “choice-of-law problem” has become a silver bullet
for nationwide class actions based on state-law claims.119 In brief, this
is the problem: in order to certify a damages class under Rule
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must find
(among a series of other prerequisites) that the questions of law and
fact common to the class “predominate” over individualized questions.120 Klaxon requires a federal court sitting in diversity to apply
the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits.121 Most such
choice-of-law rules require application of different states’ substantive
laws to different class members. As a result, the class claims are potentially governed by all fifty states’ laws. Courts have reached a nearconsensus that this renders the class uncertifiable under Rule
23(b)(3) for two reasons: first, the fact that different groups of plaintiffs’ claims are governed by different laws means that the legal questions common to the class do not predominate over questions
individual to each class member, and second, that the class is too difficult to manage through a trial, particularly when one considers the
problem of instructing a jury.122 Federal courts now generally agree
that, unless a class is governed by a single state’s law, it cannot be
certified under Rule 23.123
119 See Silberman, supra note 4, at 2009 (describing choice-of-law problem as “a
monumental barrier to class certification”); David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1247, 1282–83 (2007) (“Choice of law in multistate damages class actions is an
extremely important hinge on which certification often turns.”).
120 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
121 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
122 See, e.g., Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 728 (5th Cir. 2007) ( “[S]tate
law variations are important, in part because they would require separate jury instructions.”); Faherty v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 09-CV-12102, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23547, at *17 (D. Mass. Mar. 9, 2011) (noting that “the intricate nature of the task and
the potential for juror confusion has persuaded most courts that it is unwise” to certify
a class demanding application of many states’ laws).
123 See York-Erwin, supra note 6, at 1802–03 (“Federal courts increasingly refused
to certify nationwide damages classes, finding predominance lacking on choice-of-law
grounds.”); see, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir.
2002) (“No class action is proper unless all litigants are governed by the same legal
rules.”); Powers v. Lycoming Engines, 272 F.R.D. 414, 427 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“Given the
difficult, if not, impossible burden of instructing the jury on the different laws of
several states, a nationwide class action cannot pass the superiority test.”).
Although courts may use sub-grouping and issue classes to ease these administrative burdens, few courts have been willing to do so. See In re Pharm. Indus. Average
Wholesale Price Litig., 252 F.R.D. 83, 94 (D. Mass. 2008) (“While numerous courts
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From the period when Rule 23 was amended in 1966 until the
1990s, choice of law was not considered such an insurmountable
obstacle to class certification.124 Although the Supreme Court held
that a court could not go beyond the loose constitutional restrictions
on legislative jurisdiction to apply an otherwise inapplicable single law
to an entire class,125 courts would sometimes discount or smooth out
the differences in state law in order to ensure sufficient commonality
of the legal questions to certify the class.126 By the mid-1990s, however, tolerance for these tactics diminished. After influential opinions
by numerous circuit courts decertifying classes based on the choice-oflaw problem,127 the Third, Fifth, and Seventh in particular,128 a consensus emerged that classes requiring the application of multiple
states’ laws were not certifiable.129 That consensus has only grown
stronger, leading Linda Silberman to refer recently to the choice-oflaw problem as a “monumental barrier to class certification.”130
have talked-the-talk that grouping of multiple state laws is lawful and possible, very few
courts have walked the grouping walk.”).
124 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1780.1
(3d ed. 2005), at 202 (“[C]ourts have not always been unduly concerned about
choice-of-law issues when certifying class actions under Rule 23(b)(3).”); see also In re
Digitek Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2:08-md-01968, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53610, at
*126 (S.D. Va. May 25, 2010) (“Choice-of-law issues were treated superficially in early
class-certification opinions involving state-law claims.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
125 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 815, 821 (1985) (holding a Kansas court could not apply Kansas law to a nationwide class when 99% of the claims had
no connection with Kansas).
126 See, e.g., Alexander v. Centrafarm Grp., 124 F.R.D. 178 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Kleiner
v. First Nat’l Bank, 97 F.R.D. 683 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Judge Weinstein famously did this
in the Agent Orange litigation. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858
(2d Cir. 1984).
127 See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir.
2001); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1090 (6th Cir. 1996); Walsh v. Ford
Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1016–17, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
128 See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627, 630 (3d Cir.
1996); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741–42 (5th Cir. 1996); In re RhonePoulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995).
129 See Silberman, supra note 4, at 2002 (“But a sea change occurred with the
growth of nationwide class action litigation where choice of law issues were central
. . . . Choice of law analysis gained new prominence because attempts to structure
nationwide classes involving state law claims . . . often turn on whether the law of a
single state or multiple states is to be applied.”); Marcus, supra note 119, at 1285
(“[T]his trio of cases heralded a seismic shift in federal judicial attitudes toward the
propriety of multistate classes.”).
130 Silberman, supra note 4, at 2009; McCloud & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 374
(referring to the choice-of-law problem as posing a “virtually insuperable obstacle to
certification”).
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As this trend developed in the federal courts, plaintiffs’ lawyers
turned increasingly to some state courts that were friendlier to class
actions and willing to apply their choice-of-law rules in such a way as to
facilitate the application of a single state’s law to every class member,
thus avoiding the problem altogether.131 Although plaintiffs’ success
in this enterprise was arguably overstated—particularly with respect to
the notion that states were willing to change their choice-of-law rules
to facilitate application of a single state’s law132—Congress in large
part overrode this strategy in 2005 when it passed the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA), which has the effect of placing most class actions
in federal court.133
Both before and after CAFA, some scholars have called for a federal choice-of-law rule that would allow a single state’s law to apply to
nationwide class actions, typically the law of the defendant’s principal
place of business.134 But these proposals have not been enacted. The
Supreme Court has shown no willingness to overrule Klaxon, and the
Congress has declined to enact federal choice-of-law rules despite several opportunities. And neither Congress, nor the Court, has shown
any desire to make class certification easier—indeed, for Congress to
do so would fly in the face of the purpose of CAFA.135
Moreover, such a proposal presents significant other possible
problems, such as the potential that it would create an incentive for
defendants to relocate to states with the lowest liability standards,
knowing they would likely apply to a nationwide class—particularly in
light of the view that class-action plaintiffs would have to seek applica131 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Perspective: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1505–07 (2008).
132 See Marcus, supra note 119, at 1294. In recent years, there has been little evidence that states have developed choice-of-law rules to facilitate class actions. Richard
L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1815
(2008) (arguing that CAFA could hinder the development of state choice-of-law doctrine by moving on-point cases to federal courts); see also Linda J. Silberman, Choice of
Law in National Class Actions: Should CAFA Make a Difference?, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 54, 61 (2009) (“Most state courts—at least the highest courts of the state—have
refused to alter choice of law rules to favor or disfavor certification of a class.”).
133 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006); Cabraser, supra note 8, at 47 (describing CAFA
and the choice-of-law problem as the “coup de grâce” for mass-tort class actions).
134 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS
AND ANALYSIS § 6.01, at 322 (1994). See also generally, Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1842–43 (2006) (examining the effect that CAFA has had upon
choice-of-law doctrine).
135 See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1942–43 (“The goal of CAFA’s proponents was to
ensure that nationwide classes of the sort that some state courts had certified would
not be certified at all.”).
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tion of this state’s law in order to achieve certification.136 Moreover,
as Larry Kramer and Robert Sedler have noted, applying a single
state’s law to plaintiffs dispersed nationwide is problematic as a matter
of federalism because different states, with different tort policies, have
regulatory interests in governing disputes with which they are connected.137 Ultimately, then, the persistence of Klaxon, combined with
CAFA, has presented a major practical obstacle to nationwide masstort class actions in federal court.
B. The Shift to Multidistrict Litigation
As class actions have become harder to certify, plaintiffs have
shifted in droves to multidistrict litigation as the next-best alternative.138 The numbers are striking. Recent empirical work by the Federal Judicial Center reveals that one third of all civil cases in the
federal courts right now are part of a pending MDL.139 Moreover, as
the troubles with the choice-of-law problem might indicate, ninety
percent of these cases are products-liability cases.140 And many of
these MDLs are massive, comprising thousands of cases.141 For exam136 See Silberman, supra note 132, at 57 (“Plaintiffs press for a single law to apply—
such as the principal place of business of the defendant—even if that law offers a
lower standard of recovery than would be provided under the competing rules.”);
Trangsrud, supra note 116, at 821 (“[I]f a class action is certified, the individual plaintiff may find that the state law applied by the forum court is not as favorable as the law
which would have been applied had he been able to choose his own forum.”).
137 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 4, at 578 (“[T]he more ‘national’ the case, the less
appropriate it is for any single state’s law to govern”); Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis, State Sovereignty, and Federally-Mandated Choice of Law in “Mass Tort” Cases, 56 ALB. L.
REV. 855, 861 (1993) (arguing that application of a single state’s law is “highly undesirable both from a choice-of-law perspective and from a state sovereignty
perspective”).
138 See Fallon et al., supra note 22, at 2355 (“[W]ith the recent statutory and judicial discouragement of class actions, the federal court system has found itself turning
to the MDL’s broad remedial powers more frequently than ever before.” (footnote
omitted)); Willging & Lee, supra note 13, at 798 (“[T]he last few years have seen a
massive increase in MDL aggregate litigation.”).
139 See Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1667 (2011) ( “[B]y 2008, the
102,545 actions pending in MDLs constituted more than a third of all federal civil
cases pending in that year . . . .”).
140 Lee et al., supra note 15, at 2 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of MDL cases are
products liability cases—90% of MDL cases.”).
141 See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 115 (2010)
(“The largest MDLs encompass thousands of cases filed by legions of attorneys.”);
Willging & Lee, supra note 13, at 793 (referring to “mammoth MDL proceedings” as a
“recent phenomenon”).
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ple, the MDL involving the product-liability claims from use of the
drug Vioxx included over 25,000 claimants.142 It is no wonder, then,
that one leading commentator and judge now refers to MDL as the
“primary vehicle for the resolution of complex civil cases.”143
MDL was not always so prominent, particularly with respect to
products-liability cases. Although the original supporters of the statute envisioned that products cases would be viable MDL candidates,
there were few products-liability MDLs until the 1990s.144 Now, however, products cases make up the vast majority of the MDL docket.145
As a result of the difficulties of class certification, MDL should continue to be ascendant, and the attentions of civil-procedure scholars
should shift accordingly.146 Before turning to the choice-of-law implications of the shift to MDL, it makes sense to describe briefly the
mechanics of the MDL process.
1. How MDL Works
Multidistrict litigation has been part of the federal procedural system for over four decades now. MDL’s roots extend to the early
1960s, when the federal courts were flooded with lawsuits alleging
antitrust violations in the electrical-equipment industry.147 This
unprecedented state of affairs led the Judicial Conference to create
the “Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United
States District Courts,” which consisted of nine federal judges who
coordinated discovery and other pretrial matters in the electrical142 Silver & Miller, supra note 141, at 117.
143 Fallon et al., supra note 22, at 2324.
144 Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts, 26
REV. LITIG. 883, 907 (2007) (“[T]he number of motions for multi-districting filed in
product liability cases increased dramatically in the 1990s, by comparison with the two
previous decades. But the number filed in this decade has actually outpaced the
number of MDL motions filed during the 1990s.”).
145 Lee et al., supra note 15, at 13 (“The products liability cases dominate this
database, accounting for 92.5% of the cases. . . . The overwhelming majority of cases
that are considered and transferred by the Panel involve such claims.”).
146 See Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of
Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 657 (2011) (“[T]he MDL
process helped to make plausible the bundling of mass torts.”).
147 See DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 2.1–2.6 (1986); Judith Resnik,
From Cases to Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 29–32 (1991) (laying out the
changing perception of mass torts and class action from the 1960s to the 1990s). See
generally Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel
Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 622–25 (1964) (providing a background history on how the Judicial Conference addressed the increasing problem of electrical
equipment antitrust cases).
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equipment cases.148 Although these efforts were effective at streamlining the electrical-equipment litigation, the Committee found the tools
at its disposal inadequate and the Judicial Conference proposed a new
federal procedural statute.149 Rather than rely on voluntary participation by the various district judges handling individual cases, the new
statute proposed “centralized management under court supervision of
pretrial proceedings of multidistrict litigation to assure the ‘just and
efficient conduct’ of such actions.”150
The statute passed in 1968 with little resistance and created the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML).151 The JPML is
authorized to transfer civil actions pending in multiple districts
“involving one or more common questions of fact” to “any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”152 The “common
questions of fact” requirement is lenient, and unlike in class actions,
there is no requirement that such common questions predominate in
order to achieve aggregation.153 The panel must find only that transfer will “be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.”154
Unlike the general federal transfer statute, which provides that a
case may be transferred only to a district court where it “might have
been brought or to any district to which all parties have consented,”155
the MDL statute provides no such restriction and the JPML can transfer a case to any district.156 Indeed, most of the action in the briefing
148 HERR, supra note 147, § 2.2.
149 See In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 498–504 (J.P.M.L. 1968)
(reproducing an excerpt from The Report of the Co-Ordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation Recommending New Section 1407); see also Resnik, supra note 147, at
32–34.
150 H.R. REP. No. 90-1130, at 2 (1968).
151 HERR, supra note 147, § 2.2–2.3; see also Resnik, supra note 147, at 32–33 (noting that the Department of Justice and American Bar Association supported the
statute).
152 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006). The panel is composed of seven judges selected
by the Chief Justice. Id. § 1407(d).
153 See Sherman, supra note 16, at 2208 (“In contrast to . . . class actions, MDL is a
looser and more flexible structure allowing for transfer and consolidation based on
pragmatic considerations.”); Id. at 2209; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 17, § 3863, at
396–97 (“Section 1407 clearly does not require that there be strict identity of issues, a
predominance of common questions, or that any common questions be central to or
determinative of the controversy in order to justify transfer . . . .”).
154 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).
155 Id. § 1404(a).
156 See In re Falstaff Brewing Corp. Antitrust Litig., 434 F. Supp. 1225, 1229
(J.P.M.L. 1977) (noting that the statute allows transfer to any district for pretrial proceedings). The JPML does not take into account personal jurisdiction of the MDL
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and argument before the panel involves not whether the cases will be
consolidated but where, as the parties vie for their preferred venue
and even district judge.157 The JPML considers a variety of factors in
deciding where to consolidate a pending litigation, from the experience of the particular judge in prior MDLs, the location of the relevant evidence, and the willingness and motivation of the transferee
judge.158 The panel may, however, choose to establish the MDL in
any federal district, regardless of any preexisting territorial connection to the already-pending cases.159
After the JPML has selected a transferee court and therefore
established the MDL, future cases involving the same subject matter,
called “tag-along[s],”160 are filed in federal district courts where venue
and personal jurisdiction are appropriate.161 Requiring full-blown
briefing and argument before the JPML for every tag-along case, of
which there may be thousands,162 would be extremely inefficient, so
the JPML has adopted a streamlined procedure for transferring these
cases to the MDL.163 Unless the tag-along case clearly does not belong
court when deciding where to transfer a case. In re Highway Accident Near Rockville,
388 F. Supp. 574, 576 (J.P.M.L. 1975) (“[T]he propriety of in personam jurisdiction
in a proposed transferee district is not a criterion in considering transfer . . . under
Section 1407.”).
157 Daniel A. Richards, An Analysis of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s
Selection of Transferee District and Judge, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 311, 312 (2009) (arguing
that, although the process could be more transparent, the JPML utilizes several factors in making transfer decisions that weigh more or less heavily depending on the
context).
158 Id. at 325–26.
159 The JPML may choose to consolidate cases in a district where no related case is
currently pending and that no party suggested. Richards, supra note 157, at 337–38 &
n. 197 (describing In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1381 (J.P.M.L.
2003)); see also In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 437 F. Supp. 750, 753
(J.P.M.L. 1977) (“In appropriate circumstances, [the panel may] order transfer of a
group of actions to a district in which none of the constituent actions is pending.”).
160 See J.P.M.L. R. P. 1.1(h) (2010).
161 Cases may also, of course, be filed in state court and removed. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1448 (2006).
162 John G. Heyburn II, A View From the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2225, 2233 (2008) (noting that the JPML transfers thousands of tag-along cases each
year).
163 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 17, § 3865, at 490–91. A party seeking transfer—or
a non-party involved in the MDL—must make the JPML aware of the existence of the
case, and the JPML clerk will conditionally transfer the case unless a party objects. If
no party objects within seven days, the case is transferred, but if there is an objection,
the JPML will hear argument.
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in the MDL, these cases are rather seamlessly transferred to the MDL
court.164
Once a case is transferred, the control of the case is out of the
JPML’s hands and in the control of the transferee judge, to whom I
will refer as the “MDL judge.”165 The MDL judge has the full measure
of power over “pretrial proceedings” that the transferor court would
have had if the transfer had not occurred.166 The MDL court’s powers are consequently quite broad, ranging from coordinating and
resolving discovery-related matters,167 to deciding evidentiary motions
such as Daubert motions,168 and ruling on motions for class certification,169 motions to remand,170 and dispositive motions.171 Moreover,
the MDL court has the power to govern settlement of cases before it,
so long as they are reached prior to trial.172 Shortly after the cases are
164 Id. at 494 (“In the main . . . the later cases are consolidated and coordinated
with the earlier cases.”).
165 The JPML “has neither the power nor the inclination to dictate in any way the
manner in which the coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings are to be conducted by the transferee judge.” In re Sundstrand Data Control, Inc. Patent Litig.,
443 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (J.P.M.L. 1978). Nor does the JPML review the actions of an
MDL judge. See In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 510 F. Supp. 1220, 1226–27
(J.P.M.L. 1979).
166 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 17 § 3866, at 510–11 (“[T]he transferee judge inherits the entire pretrial jurisdiction that the transferor judge would have exercised.”).
167 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc.,
238 F. Supp. 2d 270, 279 (D.D.C. 2002) (ordering production of documents at deposition); In re Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C. on July 2, 1994, 982 F. Supp. 1052, 1056
(D.S.C. 1995) (motion to compel).
168 See, e.g., In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(resolving Daubert motion).
169 See, e.g., In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2004)
(affirming MDL court’s denial of class certification in transferred action); In re Digitek Prods. Liab. Litig., 821 F. Supp. 2d 822 (S.D. W. Va. 2010); see also WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 17, § 3866 at 526–27 (“[C]lass action rulings are particularly suited for
decision by the transferee court because that judge has an overall view of the litigation
and it is important that there not be a conflict between or among the transferor
courts . . . .”).
170 See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d
356 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (motion to remand).
171 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.36 (4th ed. 2010) (noting that a
“transferee judge has authority to dispose of the case on the merits”); see, e.g., In re
Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 252 F.R.D. 83 (D. Mass. 2008) (denying
summary judgment).
172 See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.II, 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 269 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (creating fund governing attorney’s fees in settled case); In re Managed Care
Litig., 246 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1365 (J.P.M.L. 2003) (“[S]ettlement matters are appropriate pretrial proceedings subject to centralization . . . .”).
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transferred, the MDL court will also appoint counsel on each side to
leadership roles on committees to organize the litigation.173
The MDL court, therefore, possesses significant powers, but its
jurisdiction is incomplete because it cannot try transferred actions
without the parties’ consent.174 Nor can the MDL court transfer a
case to itself on a permanent basis in order to try it. Until the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes
& Lerach,175 MDL courts commonly transferred cases to themselves in
order to try them.176 The Supreme Court unanimously ended that
practice, holding that, despite longstanding contrary practice, the
plain language of § 1407(a) dictates that the JPML “shall” remand
cases at the close of pretrial proceedings.177 There have been numerous attempts to persuade Congress to reverse Lexecon by statute, but
none have come to fruition.178 As a result, an MDL court may not try
a case transferred to it for pretrial proceedings unless the parties consent to trial.179
Despite Lexecon, the use of “bellwether trials,” or test cases from
the pool of component cases, has become an important part of MDL
practice. Securing parties’ consent for these trials is now an important
aspect of the MDL courts’ management of cases.180 The idea is that if
the court can try a representative sample of cases, it will yield important information to the participants about the strengths and weak173 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.36 (4th ed. 2010). For a critical assessment of this practice, see Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty
and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519
(2003).
174 In re Showa Denko K.K. L-Tryptophan Prods. Liab. Litig., 953 F.2d 162, 165
(4th Cir. 1992) (“The authority for consolidating cases on the order of the judicial
panel on multi-district litigation . . . is merely procedural and does not expand the
jurisdiction of the district court to which the cases are transferred.”).
175 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (holding that the statute commanded this result “even if
doing that will reverse the longstanding practice under the statute and the rule”).
176 See also Courtney E. Silver, Procedural Hassles in Multidistrict Litigation: A Call for
Reform of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and the Lexecon Result, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 461 (2009)
(recalling that during “the first thirty years of MDL practice, it was quite common” for
an MDL to transfer cases to itself for trial).
177 Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 32.
178 Marcus, supra note 13, at 2291 (“[S]ince [Lexecon], bills to add authority to
transfer for trial to the Panel’s authority have been introduced but not passed.”);
Silver, supra note 176, at 475.
179 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 17, § 3866.2 at 555 (noting that parties
may consent to trial in the MDL court).
180 Lee et al., supra note 15, at 2 (“Bellwether trials have emerged as a primary
mechanism for evaluating and resolving mass tort litigation in the multidistrict litigation context.”).
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nesses of the sides’ respective cases.181 Even though the results of
these bellwether trials are not binding on parties who are not participants in the trials, they provide important data about the value of the
claims, perhaps leading to settlement discussions.182 The process has
the advantage of working out the litigation using real cases before
actual juries, making the process appealing to those who value the
participatory aspects of jury trials.183
The traditional model for MDL, reflected in its legislative history184 and the Supreme Court’s reading of the MDL statute in Lexecon,185 provides that pretrial proceedings will at some point conclude,
and, on the recommendation of the MDL judge, the JPML will
remand the cases to the districts whence they came.186 The persistence of this vision notwithstanding, remand rarely happens.187 Few
cases are remanded,188 and scholars and courts have recognized that
181 See Fallon et al., supra note 22, at 2325 (“[B]y injecting juries and factfinding
into multidistrict litigation, bellwether trials assist in the maturation of disputes by
providing an opportunity for coordinating counsel to organize the products of pretrial
common discovery, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments and evidence, and understand the risks and costs associated with the litigation.”); Michael J.
Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and
Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 827 (1992).
182 Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475,
1485 (2005) (“A dramatic example of the effectiveness of the ‘summary jury trial’
device, for example, is the recent utilization of a one week mini-trial in the Telectronics
certified class action that was not binding on defendants or the class, but provided
both sides with sufficient information to enable them to negotiate a fair and reasonable classwide settlement.”); Nagareda, supra note 20, at 1150 (noting bellwether trials’
providing useful information to both sides); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass
Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 78 (1989).
183 See Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 594
(2008); Saks & Blanck, supra note 181, at 839.
184 See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, 3–4 (1968) (“The proposed statute affects only the
pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation.”).
185 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 36–37
(1998) (“[T]he statute places an obligation on the Panel to remand no later than the
conclusion of pretrial proceedings in the transferee court, and no exercise in
rulemaking can read that obligation out of the statute.”).
186 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.133 (4th
ed. 2004) (“The Panel looks to the transferee court to suggest when it should order
remand.”).
187 Marcus, supra note 13, at 2265–66 (noting “the great majority of cases that
never came back” to home districts); Fallon et al., supra note 22, at 2329 (“[F]ew cases
are remanded for trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in the transferee court.”)
(quoting Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151 (D. Mass.
2006)));
188 See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 15, at 17 (“9 in 10 cases that fully become part of
an MDL proceeding, and that terminate, terminate in the transferee district. In other
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MDL’s primary feature is to provide an efficient means of consolidating the cases for an eventual global settlement. As Judge Fallon, who
presided over the massive Vioxx MDL, has noted,
By virtue of the temporary national jurisdiction conferred upon it
by the MDL Panel, the transferee court is uniquely situated to preside over global settlement negotiations. Indeed, the centralized
forum created by the MDL Panel truly provides a “once-in-a-lifetime” opportunity for the resolution of mass disputes by bringing
similarly situated litigants from around the country, and their lawyers, before one judge in one place at one time.189

2. Choice of Law in MDL
MDL’s primary difference from the class action is that the cases
within it retain their individual identities. In other words, instead of
the case being formally litigated by a representative on behalf of a
group of absentee plaintiffs, the cases in an MDL keep their individual
character. That said, one must be careful not to overstate the difference. An MDL is still an aggregate proceeding. Once the MDL is
established, the litigation is run in many ways by a relatively small
number of counsel appointed to the case-management committees
established by the court. And, as several scholars have noted, like the
class action, the key virtue of the MDL is that is collects most parties in
a single organized proceeding in order to facilitate a global settlement.190 As a result, many authors have emphasized that the due process concerns of class actions are present in MDL, and may be even

words, most cases that are transferred as part of an MDL do not return to the transferor court at the conclusion of the MDL proceeding.”).
189 Fallon, et al., supra note 22, at 2340; see also Willging & Lee, supra note 13, at
804 (“[T]he availability of nonclass settlement procedures seems to provide opportunities, and perhaps incentives, for the parties to avoid the class action process while
retaining the more-or-less global settlement benefits of aggregate federal litigation.”).
190 Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 270 (2011) (“[MDL] creates the perfect conditions for an aggregate
settlement.”);”); Hensler, supra note 144, at 893 (“[A]lthough formally intended only
to streamline the pretrial process, multi-districting usually leads to some sort of aggregative disposition.”); Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 894 (2001) (“although
formally intended only to streamline the pretrial process, multi-districting usually
leads to some sort of aggregative disposition.”). Willging & Lee, supra note 13, at 801
(“[T]he MDL process has supplemented and perhaps displaced the class action devise
as a procedural mechanism for large settlements.”).
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more pronounced since the MDL structure has fewer formal procedural protections than the class action.191
There is no doubt that the MDL structure presents many of the
same concerns as the class action structure—such concerns are inherent in any massive aggregated litigation.192 Numerous commentators
have noted the almost “quasi-class action” nature of MDL.193 And, as
many scholars in favor of aggregate litigation have suggested, the costs
of aggregate litigation also come with benefits.194 Aggregate litigation
offers important efficiencies and opportunities to pool resources that
make it possible for plaintiffs to take on more powerful corporate
defendants on a level playing field, and prevent the court system from
being overwhelmed by massive controversies.195
All that understood, it is important to note the ways in which an
MDL is different from a class action. Indeed, although MDL resembles
191 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between, 58
U. KAN. L. REV. 889, 898 (2010) (“[MDLs] proceed in a procedural no man’s land—
somewhere in between individual litigation and class action litigation, but without the
[procedural] protections of either.”); Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-orNothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979, 1019 (2010) (discussing global settlement
in the Vioxx MDL and how it may have harmed clients and placed attorneys in an
ethically untenable situation).
192 See William W Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation Pending
in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1529, 1531 (1995) (But although aggregation can produce significant benefits by reducing duplicative activity, it raises concerns. Aggregation may compromise litigants’ rights to forum selection, impair
litigants’ autonomy, diminish individualized resolution of claims, strain judges’ management capacity, and create a risk that procedural modifications will affect parties’
substantive rights. (footnote omitted)).
193 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (E.D. La.
2009) (“While an MDL is distinct from a class action, the substantial similarities
between the two warrant the treatment of an MDL as a quasi-class action.”); In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Erichson, supra
note 173, at 539 (arguing non-class aggregation structures bear “powerful resemblance to class actions”); Silver & Miller, supra note 141, at 151.
Indeed, it has been a quarter century since Stephen Burbank observed that MDL
was among “dubious packaging strategies that are supposedly provisional but that in
substantive terms may be irremediable . . . .” Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1471 (1987); see also id. at 1483 (“Individual dignity,
effectuation, and participation compete with efficient administration at every turn.
They also compete with judicial power.”(footnote omitted)).
194 Cooper, supra note 84, at 20 (“[T]here is no reason to suppose that procedural
advantage will always outweigh procedural disadvantage.”); Marcus, supra note 119, at
1292 (explaining benefits accompanying consolidated litigation devices).
195 See Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1186 (2010) (arguing aggregation benefits plaintiffs and the
alternative of mass individual litigation would be worse).
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in important ways a representative suit, it is not quite the same,
because the cases retain their individual character.196 Unlike a class
action, there are no absentee plaintiffs, and the cases are separately
filed and prosecuted. And there will not be a single jury trial to
decide the entirety of the case. As a result, the MDL has something of
a hybrid character—not quite as aggregated as a class action, but consolidated to a significant degree.197 Paramount among these differences is choice of law. Unlike a class action, which requires such a
high degree of cohesion to warrant representative litigation, MDL
allows for consolidation without the same degree of similarity.
Because cases need not be grouped and tried together in all respects,
differences among the cases are allowed to persist.
As a result, MDL accommodates well both the Klaxon/Van Dusen
framework and its underlying policies. Indeed, courts have unanimously held that Klaxon and Van Dusen apply to cases transferred to
MDLs. That is, a case filed in a proper venue and transferred to the
MDL carries with it the choice-of-law rules of the transferor court.198
If the MDL court handles a dispositive motion or tries a case by consent, it applies the choice-of-law rules of the transferor court. As a
result, the policies of Klaxon and Van Dusen are not as threatened by
the aggregation process: the choice-of-law rules of the state where the
case was filed are vindicated, and the inclusion of the case in the federal mass-tort proceeding neither changes the choice-of-law rules, nor

196 Howard M. Erichson, Multidistrict Litigation and Aggregation Alternatives, 31
SETON HALL L. REV. 877, 881 (2000) (“MDL, however, cannot be understood without
reference to alternative or complementary aggregation procedures, especially the
class action.”); Silver & Miller, supra note 141, at 113 (“MDLs are not class actions . . . .
[They] simply aggregate individual lawsuits in a single court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1407 for the sake of convenience and efficiency.”).
197 See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183,
215 (describing growing importance of “hybrids” of individual and aggregate litigation); Nagareda, supra note 20, at 1113–14 (“Hybridization [is] the combination of
individual actions with some manner of centralizing technique or mechanism, just
not always or inevitably the unity of litigation the class action device generates.”).
198 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 17, § 3866 (“[I]n actions in which a federal court
would be guided or governed by state law, the transferee court is bound to apply the
law that the transferor court would follow.”); see, e.g., Chang v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 599 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When a diversity case is transferred by the
multidistrict litigation panel, the law applied is that of the jurisdiction from which the
case was transferred . . . .”); In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on 8/
29/90, 81 F.3d 570, 576 opinion amended on denial of reh’g sub nom. Perez v. Lockheed
Corp., 88 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1996).
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the substantive law.199 Moreover, aggregation can be achieved without crafting a choice-of-law rule that would require the application of
a single state’s law to a nationwide, dispersed tort, avoiding the dueprocess and federalism concerns associated with that strategy—even
assuming such a rule were in the offing from a recalcitrant Congress.
Although it is undoubtedly true that these choice-of-law determinations do not play out in each case, each case retains its choice-of-law
identity, and plaintiffs are not faced with the choice of trading the law
to which they would otherwise be entitled for the benefits of
aggregation.200
III.

DIRECT FILING

AND

CHOICE

OF

LAW

Although the Klaxon/Van Dusen framework fits well with multidistrict litigation, one recent trend creates new tension. The practice is
called direct filing, and it has been adopted often in MDLs over the
last five years. I will discuss the mechanics in more detail below, but,
essentially, the process allows plaintiffs in the potentially thousands of
tag-along cases filed after the establishment of the MDL to bypass the
transfer process and file their cases directly into the MDL court, as
defendants waive any objections to personal jurisdiction or venue.
Although defendants formally waive defenses to facilitate the practice,
the process purports to achieve significant efficiencies for all parties,
the courts, and the JPML. Direct filing allows the parties to bypass the
administratively burdensome transfer process, and the court, in many
cases, is allowed to retain complete jurisdiction over the cases to better facilitate a bellwether trial plan.
Although the process does create significant efficiencies—efficiencies that make the cases comprising the MDL look more like a
coherent mass—it creates a knotty choice-of-law problem that cuts to
the root of the federalism policies underlying Klaxon and Van Dusen:
what law ought to apply to the direct-filed cases? Courts are currently
struggling with that question, and no court has yet reached a satisfactory answer. In this section, I will highlight how direct filing works,
the various approaches courts have taken, and discuss how no current
solution to the problem is consistent with the policies underlying
Klaxon and Van Dusen—policies which are better accommodated by
the traditional MDL transfer system.
199 Kramer, supra note 4, at 576–77 (“[T]he policy of preserving the parties’ substantive rights . . . was the driving force behind the decisions in both Klaxon and Van
Dusen.”) (footnote omitted).
200 See Trangsrud, supra note 116, at 823–24.
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In particular, I will examine the decision regarding choice of law
and direct filing in the MDL involving the birth control drug, Yaz.
The decision in this case, which is among the first to grapple with the
problems created by direct filing, highlights the distortions the practice creates and the significance of the issue, as the MDL currently
comprises over 9,000 individual cases and counting.
Whatever one thinks about the benefits or drawbacks of Klaxon,
the growth of direct filing in MDL demonstrates that the current
framework is being stretched to its limits. After examining courts’
current approaches to the problem, I suggest a solution. In my view,
there is no need for the advent of direct filing to threaten the federalism benefits of the MDL framework or create additional unpredictability for litigants. By requiring direct-filing plaintiffs to select a
home district where venue and personal jurisdiction would be appropriate, we can preserve the choice-of-law-related benefits of the MDL
while also retaining the efficiency benefits of direct filing. Ultimately,
direct filing demonstrates how innovations in aggregate litigation that
do not pay attention to choice of law create serious problems, and
how such innovations may be maintained without undermining the
benefits of the Klaxon choice-of-law regime.
A. The Mechanics of Direct Filing
Direct filing works a significant procedural change in the MDL
process. As noted above, typically, after the JPML has established the
MDL, future cases sharing a common question of fact with the MDL,
called “tag-alongs,” are filed in federal district courts where venue and
personal jurisdiction are appropriate, and those courts maintain dockets for those cases.201 Then, a party seeking transfer—or a non-party
involved in the MDL—must make the JPML aware of the existence of
the case, and the JPML clerk will conditionally transfer the case unless
a party objects. If no party objects within seven days, the case is transferred. If there is an objection, the JPML will set a briefing schedule,
but such objections rarely succeed.202
Illustrating the adage that the shortest distance between two
points is a straight line, courts and parties have devised a way around
this process: direct filing. Under a direct-filing regime, plaintiffs in
tag-along cases filed after the establishment of the MDL can bypass
transfer and file their cases directly into the MDL court, regardless of
whether personal jurisdiction and venue would be appropriate in the
201
202

See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.1.
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MDL district.203 As a result, no action is required on the part of the
JPML, the parties avoid the hassle of the transfer process, and the
MDL court has complete jurisdiction over the case and may try it.204
The MDL court is also not bound by Lexecon to remand direct-filed
cases at the close of pretrial proceedings (though some courts provide
for remand to some to-be-agreed-upon venue if pretrial proceedings
conclude), facilitating easier administration of the entire litigation,
and, potentially, a global settlement.205 In addition, the MDL court
has a more representative pool from which it can draw bellwether
cases for trial, both in terms of geographical connection and state substantive law.206
Ultimately, direct filing creates numerous efficiencies for all parties. The JPML is not burdened with transferring cases to and from
home districts. Home district judges and clerks’ offices need not
undertake administrative burdens associated with cases destined for
transfer and which will likely not return. The MDL court retains complete control over a greater portion of the overall pool of cases for
trial and facilitation of global settlement, which is likely why MDL
judges encourage the practice. These benefits extend to the parties as
well, particularly defendants and firms representing a significant number of plaintiffs. Lodging all of the cases in a single court in the first
instance more seamlessly aggregates the litigation.207
203 Indeed, the direct filing stipulation is necessary because many cases might otherwise not be able to be filed in the district. Moreover, some direct-filing stipulations
ensure that there is an appropriate district to which the MDL court might transfer the
cases after pretrial proceedings have concluded. This paper argues that plaintiffs
should make such choices explicit.
204 See Fallon et al., supra note 22, at 2355 (“With greater sources of litigation
subject to MDL consideration and larger numbers of individual cases subject to MDL
transfer, it has become increasingly more time-consuming and expensive for an individual case to find its way into a transferee court.”).
205 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.132 (4th ed. 2004) (noting policy
reasons for MDL judge to have complete jurisdiction, including the judge’s understanding of the issues and “a greater ability to facilitate a global settlement”); Fallon,
et al., supra note 22, at 2341 (noting that the MDL court can’t control settlement of
the cases once they disperse).
206 See Fallon et al., supra note 22, at 2356 (“A case filed directly into the MDL,
whether by a citizen of the state in which the MDL sits or by a citizen of another
jurisdiction, vests the transferee court with complete authority over every aspect of
that case.”).
207 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 897, 904 (E.D. La. 2007)
(“Direct filing into the MDL avoids the expense and delay associated with plaintiffs
filing in local federal courts around the country after the creation of an MDL and
waiting for the Panel to transfer these ‘tag-a-long’ actions to this district.”); Fallon, et
al., supra note 22, at 2354–56.
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Despite these efficiencies, direct filing is not automatically available because defendants must agree to the practice. The MDL statute,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Lexecon, does not allow the
MDL court to override personal-jurisdiction and venue requirements
to achieve complete jurisdiction over a case.208 As a result, the defendants must waive these defenses in order to allow for direct filing.209
Moreover, MDL courts have been unwilling to allow plaintiffs to direct
file when it is clear that other courts would be more convenient and
appropriate forums, and the MDL forum has no connection to the
underlying dispute.210 Case-wide direct filing stipulations, therefore,
are most often utilized in cases where the MDL is located in a jurisdiction without general personal jurisdiction over all of the defendants in
the litigation, most likely a jurisdiction other than the primary defendants’ places of incorporation or principal places of business.211
Such case-wide stipulations are necessary because obtaining
defendants’ permission to directly file tag-along-case-by-tag-along-case
208 See In re Vioxx, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 904 (“[I]t is not clear whether defendants
can be ‘properly subjected to suit’ in the MDL forum.” (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964)). Courts have been unwilling to require defendants to
agree to direct filing when they refuse to waive these defenses. See In re NuvaRing
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-1964 RWS, 2009 WL 4825170, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec.
11, 2009); In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 071873,
2008 WL 5423488, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 29, 2008).
209 See also In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Security Breach
Litig., No. H-10-171, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34953 at *21 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011)
(“In some cases, a defendant facilitates direct filing through a stipulation waiving personal jurisdiction for the pretrial proceedings under § 1407.”).
210 In these cases, MDL courts are unwilling to allow direct filing because such
filings contradict the file-and-transfer process in the MDL statute. See, e.g., In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:03-cv-1507-WRW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29791 (E.D. Ark.
Aug. 31, 2004); In re Norplant Contraceptive Litig., 950 F. Supp. 779, 781 (E.D. Tex.
1996); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 1014, 1995 WL 428683,
at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1995) (noting that although venue is typically waivable,
courts may raise it sua sponte).
211 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54
(2011) (describing the “paradigms” of general jurisdiction over a corporation as a
place where the corporation is “fairly regarded as home,” such as place of incorporation or principal place of business). Even if general jurisdiction might be appropriate
over the primary defendant in the MDL district, it might not be over other affiliates of
the primary defendant, such as distributors or foreign parents, or other defendants,
such as manufacturers of other products or component parts. Moreover, divergences
in long-arm statutes and uncertainty over the scope of jurisdiction in products-liability
cases after the Supreme Court’s June 2011 personal-jurisdiction decisions make it
likely that MDL courts will avoid choppy jurisdictional waters more often through use
of direct-filing stipulations.
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is both inefficient and fraught with potential problems.212 Moreover,
as noted above, MDL courts have been hostile to the practice because
it departs from the usual operation of the MDL statute.213 As a result,
for the last several years courts have begun experimenting with directfiling stipulations in case management orders that apply to the MDL
as a whole.214 In essence, at the outset of the MDL, the court encourages the primary defendants to agree to allow future plaintiffs in all
tag-along cases to file directly, regardless of potential personal-jurisdiction and venue problems. As a result, the MDL becomes more seamlessly integrated and amenable to global settlement. Judge Fallon of
the Eastern District of Louisiana embraced this practice in the MDLs
involving the drugs Vioxx and Propulsid. This procedure proved
exceedingly effective in the Vioxx MDL, which included over 6,000
cases, 2,000 of which were direct-filed.215
B. Direct Filing and Choice of Law
Since Vioxx, direct filing has proven increasingly popular, and
courts have instituted similar orders in numerous large diversity-based
MDLs.216 But it is becoming clear that this procedure, which appears
212 For instance, one can imagine defendants deciding which cases to allow for
direct filing based on whether they would prefer that the MDL be able to use the case
as a bellwether trial. Moreover, piecemeal direct filing creates potential problems
should the cases ever be remanded. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig.,
946 F. Supp. 3, 3–4 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
213 See supra note 210.
214 By “major” defendants, I mean those defendants who are named in every case,
like the manufacturers of allegedly defective products, or component parts of those
products.
215 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 897, 904 (E.D. La. 2007); see also
Sherman, supra note 1, at 235 (“([T]wo principal existing mechanisms for aggregation—consolidation and class action.”).
216 See, e.g., In re Actos Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2299 (W.D. La. 2012); In re
Chantix, MDL No. U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. Ala. June 12, 2012); In re Trasylol Prods.
709 F.Supp.2d 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2010); In re Yasmin Prods., M.D.L. No. 2100; In re
FEMA Trailers Prods. MDL No. 2100, 2011 WL 1375011 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011); In re
Heparin Prods. Liab. Litig., 803 F. Supp. 2d 712 (N.D. Ohio 2011); In re Digitek
Prods. Liab. Litig., 264 F.R.D. 244 (S.D. W. Va. 2010); In re Trasylol, 709 F.Supp.2d
1323 (S.D. Fla. 2010); In re Oral Sodium Phosphate Prods., MDL No. 2066, 2009 WL
2601395 (N.D. Ohio, Aug. 24, 2009); In re Bausch & Lomb Contact Lens Solution
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 766000, 2009 WL 4893926 (N.Y. Sup. July 14, 2009); In re
FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1769 M07-1873, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63099 (E.D. Fla. May 4, 2008); In re Chantix Prods. Liab. Litig., 655 F.
Supp. 2d 1346, (J.P.M.L. 2003).
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so simple on its face, is fraught with potential problems.217 Foremost
among these issues is how to decide what substantive law should apply
to direct-filed cases in an MDL, but courts have also been concerned
about where cases ought to go if pretrial proceedings conclude.218
These problems cut to the core of the MDL’s hybrid character as an
aggregated litigation that purports to respect, and not disturb, each
individual case’s identity, and recreates the tensions between aggregation and choice of law that plagued the class action.
To see how the problem plays out, it is necessary to look at the
specifics of direct-filing stipulations. The stipulations crafted by the
pioneering Vioxx and Propulsid courts, and nearly every court since,
say nothing about the effect of direct filing on choice of law. Rather,
the stipulations state only that defendants waive their venue and jurisdiction-related defenses to allow for direct filing, and that, if pretrial
proceedings are ever concluded, the cases will be transferred to a
proper venue. For instance, the Vioxx stipulation provided that:
In order to eliminate the delays associated with transfer of cases
filed in or removed to other federal district courts to this Court, and
to promote judicial efficiency, defendant Merck . . . has stipulated
and agreed that it will not assert any objection of improper
venue . . . as to any VIOXX(R)-related cases filed directly in the
Eastern District of Louisiana that emanate from districts outside the
Eastern District of Louisiana and that would appropriately be
included in this multidistrict litigation proceeding. Accordingly, a
plaintiff may now file any such complaint against Merck directly in
the Eastern District of Louisiana, rather than in a federal district
court affording proper venue.219
217 In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 07-1873, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63099, at *6–7 (E.D. La. May 4, 2012) (“[D]irect filing could potentially affect [plaintiffs’] substantive rights.”); Fin. Inst. Track Litig. v. Heartland Bank,
No. H-10-171, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34953, at *20 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011) (“But
direct filings may present jurisdictional, venue, or related issues.”).
218 See Fallon et al., supra note 22, at 2253; see also Fin. Inst. Track, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34953 at *21 n.5 (“Courts have expressed concern that selecting the forum by
direct filing could present anomalous choice-of-law results.”).
219 In re Vioxx, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 903. The stipulation continued:
Merck’s stipulation and agreement in this regard is contingent on the
understanding that upon the completion of all pretrial proceedings applicable to a case directly filed before this Court pursuant to this provision, this
Court . . . will transfer that case to a federal district court of proper venue, as
defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1391, based on the recommendations of the parties to
that case. The Court intends to proceed consistent with that understanding.
Id. at 903–04. Thus far, it appears that no MDL including a direct-filing stipulation
has ever followed through with this post hoc transfer process. The case that has come
closest is Seroquel, in which the court recommended that cases be transferred and
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Some courts issuing direct-filing stipulations have followed this
basic template, which says nothing about how direct filing will affect
choice of law, or simply proclaim that direct filing will have no effect
on choice of law.220 Nevertheless, several courts, including the Vioxx
court, recognized that choice of law presented an issue early on.221 In
Vioxx, the court expressed uncertainty as to how to proceed, and ultimately decided that it was required to follow the letter of the Klaxon
rule, and apply the choice-of-law rules of Louisiana, the state in which
the MDL court sat, to all of the direct-filed cases, even though the
court maintained that direct filing “was not intended to alter the substantive legal landscape.”222 Other courts have followed suit and
applied the choice-of-law rules of the state of the MDL court to directfiled cases.223 The near-consensus approach that has developed in
remanded at the close of pretrial proceedings. That “threat” of remand apparently
provoked the parties to settle the case.
220 None of the direct-filing stipulations referenced supra at note 216 explain the
effects of the stipulation on choice of law. See, e.g., Case-Management Order No. 2, at
12, In re Chantix Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2092 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 2, 2010) (“The
fact that a case was filed directly in the MDL proceedings also shall have no impact on
the choice of law to be applied.”).
221 See In re Vioxx, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 904 (“[T]his potential implication of direct
filing is one that should be considered by other MDL courts.”); In re Vioxx Prods.
Liab. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 799, 806 (E.D. La. 2007) (“The Court previously discussed the use of direct filing in this MDL and has concluded that Louisiana’s choiceof-law rules must be applied in such cases, unless, of course, the parties stipulate otherwise.”); see also Skandro v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., No. 2:06-MN-77777-DCN, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76657, at *8–9 (D.S.C. Oct. 11, 2007) (“A straightforward application
of Erie would require this court to apply South Carolina law in those cases, yet it would
be an odd result to subject plaintiffs to South Carolina law simply because they took
advantage of the direct filing procedure—a procedure that provides benefits to all
parties and preserves judicial resources.”).
222 In re Vioxx, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 805. The Vioxx court recognized the problem,
but ultimately found that any distorting effects of the litigation were solved by Louisiana’s borrowing statute for statute of limitations, but the court did not grapple with
the question of whether strict application of Klaxon was appropriate. See also In re
Vioxx, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 805 n.10 (“Pretrial Order No. 11 is merely a procedural
vehicle constructed to reduce costs and promote efficiency; it was not intended to
alter the substantive legal landscape.”).
223 The MDL involving the drug Trasylol, centralized in the Southern District of
Florida, embraced direct filing and applied Florida choice-of-law rules to all cases
filed there, regardless of the home states of the parties. In re Trasylol Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 1:08-MD-01928, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38012, at *139 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18,
2011) (applying Florida choice-of-law rules to MDL case direct-filed in Florida even
though the plaintiffs were domiciled and injured in Oklahoma); see also Byers v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 607 F. Supp. 2d 840, 844 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Lanigan v. Express Scripts,
Inc., No. 4:05-MD-01672-SNL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26127, at *18 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6,
2008).
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direct filing has been to apply the choice-of-law rules of the state of
the MDL court to all direct-filed cases.
This result is inconsistent with the policy underpinnings of
Klaxon and Van Dusen. As noted in Part I, these cases effectuate two
central policies: first, that the accident of diversity should not change
the choice-of-law rules that would otherwise apply to a case, and, second, that the federal government should not override a state’s choiceof-law rules because those rules are part of a state’s substantive law, in
the sense that they define the reach and strength of those laws in a
multistate dispute. Applying the choice-of-law rules of the state in
which the MDL court sits to direct-filed cases undermines both of
these policies.
With respect to the first policy, that diversity should not change
the choice-of-law rules that would otherwise apply in a case, following
the letter of Klaxon in direct-filed cases causes that very result. Directfiling stipulations are usually necessary when the JPML centralizes an
MDL in a federal court that would not otherwise be an appropriate
venue in most cases filed by plaintiffs who are not residents of the
MDL state. By waiving defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction or
proper venue across the board in these cases, potentially thousands of
cases will be filed directly into the MDL court—a court that would not
otherwise have been the forum for many cases if the MDL had never
existed.224 Moreover, even if personal jurisdiction were appropriate
over all defendants in the MDL forum, the location of the MDL combined with direct filing will act as a magnet for cases that would be
filed there for no other reason. As a result, a different state’s choiceof-law rules apply, potentially changing the results of cases, due solely
to the existence of the MDL. Different results in individual cases are
particularly likely when one considers the differences between states’
products-liability laws—an issue I will turn to in earnest when discussing the Yaz MDL below.225 Klaxon and Van Dusen were primarily concerned about a federal and state court in the same state reaching a
different result.226 As a practical matter, that occurs in direct-filing
because that procedure facilitates cases—and the application of
224 It is of course true that a defendant may waive defenses of lack of personal
jurisdiction and improper venue in any case. But it is unlikely that a plaintiff from a
faraway state would select the MDL forum, or that defendants would waive these
defenses, absent the existence of the MDL. In dispersed mass torts, plaintiffs tend to
sue near home. Direct filing creates a strong incentive for the plaintiff to choose the
MDL court to avoid the transfer process.
225 See SYMENONIDES, supra note 35, at 271 (noting effects of differences in states’
products-liability and choice-of-law rules).
226 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
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choice-of-law rules—in federal court that could not otherwise be
brought in the courts of the same state.227
With respect to the second Klaxon/Van Dusen policy, applying the
letter of Klaxon rule is also an uneasy fit. Klaxon protects a state’s
policy with respect to the strength and reach of its own law through
choice-of-law rules. In direct-filed cases, cases are more often filed
into a federal court whose state has no interest in applying its own law
to a dispute. For instance, in the Trasylol MDL, centralized in Florida,
the defendant was a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place
of business in Indiana. In one representative direct-filed case, the
plaintiffs were residents of Virginia who suffered injury in Virginia.
The court held that Florida choice-of-law rules applied pursuant to
Klaxon.228 But such a result is odd in light of Klaxon policy because
Florida tort law was not a plausible candidate to govern this case.
Indeed, to apply Florida law in the case would probably have been
unconstitutional, even under the Supreme Court’s lax standards,
because Florida had no connection to the underlying dispute, aside
from being the forum state.229 Applying Florida’s choice-of-law rules
to decide the reach of Virginia and Pennsylvania law, then, is an odd
result.230
This problem was not lost on Cavers and Currie in the 1960s.
Currie memorably referred to it as the problem of the “disinterested
third state”: when the forum was placed in the position of deciding
which of two (or more) other states’ law should govern a particular
case.231 In other words, a neutral forum should not be deciding
choice-of-law disputes because that forum would be defining the
227 This is likely because personal jurisdiction over the defendant is questionable
in forum based on the extent of forum contacts, or because even if a defendant might
be amenable to personal jurisdiction in the state, a state court would dismiss the case
on forum non conveniens grounds.
228 Lewandoski v. Bayer Corp., No. 08-MD-01928, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128951, at
*9 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2010).
229 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 427 U.S. 797, 821 (1985).
230 The results are also odd if the MDL state has a different choice-of-law approach
than both interested states. For example, consider a tort case in which either Maryland or Virginia law might apply, but the injury occurred in Virginia. Both states
follow the First Restatement and would apply the law of the place of the injury. If the
MDL court is located in a Second Restatement state that comparatively underemphasizes the place of the injury, a law may wind up applying that neither interested
state would apply. Although it is of course true that this is a potential problem in
individual litigation, MDL increases its prevalence significantly. This paper does not
seek to revise the rules of personal jurisdiction, but the increasing scope of the problem presented by nationwide mass-tort MDLs suggests it may be time to do so.
231 Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754,
764 (1963).
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scope of other states’ laws in a multistate dispute. Currie saw the intellectual problem, but noted that it was rarely observed in practice
because plaintiffs typically sued in a forum which could apply its substantive law to the litigation.232 Even so, Currie contended, “the
problems presented by the phenomenon are so difficult that it ought
to be avoided whenever that is reasonably possible.”233 The rise of
direct filing suggests that if the problem was rare then, it is not rare
now; rather, it is cropping up in some of our largest litigations.
Currie and Cavers understood the “disinterested third state”
problem as implicating Klaxon: when a state court is disinterested, the
justification for a federal court sitting in diversity to apply that state’s
choice-of-law rules is weakened—in Erie terms, the choice-of-law rules
of the forum state start to look more “procedural” and less “substantive” when they are simply umpiring a dispute between other states.
Cavers recognized this and conceded that in such a situation a federal
court’s departure from the forum state’s choice-of-law rules “would
not result in an inroad upon, or an undesired extension of, the forum
state’s own policies” and is therefore “not one that calls for the preservation of the Klaxon rule.”234 Currie agreed.235
Both Currie and Cavers acknowledged, however, that it is insufficient to note only the warrant for departing from Klaxon. The question of what choice-of-law rules ought to apply in such situations
remains, particularly in the absence of Congressional legislation.236
Recognizing the vacuum, neither Currie nor Cavers was prepared to
abandon Klaxon, because the only plausible alternative was federal
common law, which they each believed would increase confusion and
lead to unprincipled and potentially retrograde choice-of-law rules.237
232 Id. at 765 (noting that the problem’s “occurrence is extremely rare”); see also
id. at 789 n.126 (“By hypothesis the disinterested forum is a rare phenomenon.”).
233 Id. at 767.
234 Cavers, supra note 11, at 737.
235 Currie, supra note 231, at 786 (“[T]he basic principle underlying the Klaxon
doctrine—that a state’s power to determine the nature and scope of its domestic policy should not be impaired—must be deliberately limited.”).
236 In a sense, the problem hearkens back to the problem of interpleader—when
the forum selected really may have no interest in the dispute. See Griffin v. McCoach,
313 U.S. 498 (1941).
237 See supra Part I. Both Currie and Cavers were willing to make an exception,
however, for interpleader cases. See Currie, supra note 231, at 789.
With respect to a proposal by the ALI to bring into federal court multiple parties
when all parties could not be brought within the jurisdiction of a state court, Cavers
was prepared to depart from Klaxon and allow federal common law of choice-of-law,
but only on the ground that “a federal court is exercising a jurisdiction that no state
court could exercise. . . .” Cavers, supra note 11, at 746 (emphasis added). This is not
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So long as Klaxon remains on the books—and there is no indication
that the Supreme Court or Congress intends to overrule it—the
notion that the federal courts would start making common law choiceof-law rules with respect to diversity cases seems farfetched. In any
event, application of a federal common law for cases within an MDL
would be a massive departure from Klaxon and Van Dusen—something courts should not do lightly.
That said, direct filing in MDL greatly increases the likelihood of
disinterested-third-state problems by creating a disinterested magnet
forum in the MDL court, whether or not the forum can exercise personal or legislative jurisdiction over the defendant in all cases. The
problem also surfaced often in class actions. In class actions, personal
jurisdiction over the defendant can be established through the claim
of the representative plaintiff, even if that claim is based on specific
jurisdiction.238 This means that a single state’s choice-of-law rules may
wind up applying to a nationwide class of plaintiffs even though the
state where the class action is filed would be “disinterested” in the vast
majority of the claims.239 Ultimately, although courts do not consider
this to be the primary “choice-of-law problem” for nationwide, diversity-based class actions, it presents the complications of the disinterested-third-state problem and Klaxon on a large scale. One benefit of
MDL is that it more often avoids the problem; direct filing replicates
it.
But recognizing that the reasons for applying Klaxon are weak
does not alone provide a solution, especially in light of the fact that
federal common law is not in the offing. A ready example of the
problems that can arise when a court departs from Klaxon without an
alternative can be found in the first court willing to move away from
the letter of the Klaxon rule for direct-filed cases: the court presiding
over the massive MDL involving the birth-control drug, Yaz.
C. The Yaz Litigation
The major products-liability MDL related to the sale and marketing of the oral contraceptive Yaz (and related brands)240 squarely
the case in an MDL—there are proper forums for every component case in the MDL
and there is no need to depart from Klaxon.
238 See Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the
National Debate About “Class Action Fairness,” 58 S.M.U. L. REV. 1313, 1331 (2005);
Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 623 (1986).
239 The Shutts Court did not address this problem, but in so doing it arguably
missed the key lesson of Klaxon.
240 The litigation involving Yaz involves a series of drugs with the same active
ingredient, such as Natazia, Ocella, and Beyaz. I refer to them collectively as Yaz.
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presents the federalism and choice-of-law problems posed by multidistrict litigation and direct filing.241 In this massive MDL, which now
includes nearly 10,000 cases and counting, the court wrote the first
opinion rejecting the application of the letter of the Klaxon rule to the
then-over 6200 direct-filed cases in the MDL. (Since the opinion, the
number of direct-filed cases has ballooned to nearly 9000.) But, in so
doing, the court revealed that rejecting the letter of the Klaxon rule
can also undermine the policies underlying Klaxon and Van Dusen.
The Yaz family of drugs, developed by Bayer Pharmaceuticals,
consists of oral contraceptives whose active ingredient is a synthetic
version of the ovulation-blocking progestin hormone drospenirone,
which was developed to mitigate the side effects associated with older
forms of birth control.242 During clinical trials, the drug also showed
potential for additional benefits beyond contraception, and the FDA
approved the drug both for birth control and to treat premenstrual
dysphoric disorder (PMDD) (a severe form of premenstrual syndrome
(PMS)) and moderate acne.243
Upon its release in 2006, Yaz was an immediate success. It quickly
became America’s top-selling birth-control pill and Bayer’s best-selling
drug, eventually bringing in $1.62 billion in worldwide sales in 2010
alone.244 Part of the drug’s early success was due to a marketing strategy centered on the benefits of Yaz beyond contraception, including
improving conditions as varied as “moodiness,” “increased appetite,”
“bloating,” “fatigue,” and “acne.”245 While this marketing may have
vaulted the drug to early success, it also caught the attention of the
FDA, which proclaimed that Yaz’s advertisements were “misleading
because they broaden the drug’s indication, overstate the efficacy of
YAZ, and minimize serious risks associated with the use of the
241 See In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2011 WL 1375011 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011).
242 See Tammy Worth, New Pills, New Issues: Yaz and Yasmin Spur Lawsuits, L.A.
TIMES, Apr., 19, 2010, at E3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/19/
health/la-he-yaz-20100419.
243 See Warning Letter from Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs. to Reinhord Franzen, President and CEO of Bayer, (Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/
ucm053993.pdf. [hereinafter “Warning Letter”].
244 Richard Knox, With Birth Control Pills, New Isn’t Always Better, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129258505;
Bayer Supports Yaz and Yasmin, Despite Possible Increased Blood Clot Risk, DRUG INDUSTRY
DAILY (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.fdanews.com/newsletter/article?articleId=136221
&issueId=14672.
245 Knox, supra note 244.
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drug.”246 Ultimately, to avoid further regulatory action, Bayer took
the rare step of airing corrective advertisements, but the ads did not
dampen enthusiasm for Yaz, which continues to be a top seller.247
Yaz remains a best seller, but the drug’s potentially dangerous
side effects persist. As the warning label states, in some women Yaz
causes elevated potassium levels, which causes slower blood flow, leading to severe clotting and pulmonary embolisms, resulting in heart
attacks, strokes, and other health problems.248 Although Bayer contends that the drugs are safe and the risks are overstated, it voluntarily
enhanced the safety warnings on Yaz labeling in March 2011.249
The extent of the risks is unclear, but, unsurprisingly, Yaz has
spawned widespread litigation by those claiming to have been injured
by the drug or deceived by Bayer’s advertising.250 The JPML consolidated the federal diversity cases into an MDL in 2009 in the Southern
District of Illinois, where several actions were pending, and which
would “provide[ ] a geographically central forum for nationwide litigation in which actions are pending in various districts across the
country.”251 At the time of consolidation, some eighty four Yaz cases
were pending in the federal courts.252 Since then, that number has
skyrocketed to nearly 10,000 cases and counting.253 This enormous
246 Warning Letter, supra note 243, at 1.
247 See Natasha Singer, A Pill That Promised Too Much, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at
B9 (describing Bayer’s $20 million corrective ad campaign).
248 Id. Two studies released in April 2011 by the British Medical Journal found
that use of drospirenone increased risks of blood clotting by two or three times over
traditional birth control. Kirsten Hallam, Birth-Control Pills With Drospirenone Raise Clot
Risk in Study, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-04-21/birth-control-pills-with-drospirenone-raise-clot-risk-in-study.html.
249 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., Safety
Labeling Changes Approved by FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research – March 2011
and April 2012, http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/SafetyInformation/ucm2498
59.htm (last updated May 23, 2012).
250 See Sylvia Hsieh, Birth Control Pills Give Rise to Mass Tort, LAWYERS USA, July 17,
2009, available at http://lawyersusaonline.com/blog/2009/07/17/birth-control-pillsgive-rise-to-mass-tort/; see also, e.g., Complaint, Plaisance v. Bayer Corp., No. 3:09-cv20108 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2009), ECF No. 1 (describing products-liability and fraud
claims).
251 Transfer Order, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices, &
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2100, at 3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2009). Bayer is not incorporated in Illinois, nor is its principal place of business there. As a result, general jurisdiction over Bayer, its foreign and domestic distributors and affiliates, in the district
for every Yaz-related injury nationwide is at least questionable, hence the need for the
stipulation. See HAY ET AL., supra note 31, § 6.9.
252 Transfer Order, supra note 251, at 1.
253 See Multidistrict Litigation, S. DIST. OF ILL., http://www.ilsd.uscourts.gov/mdl/
mdl2100.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).
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MDL is paradigmatic of how mass products-liability torts have come to
be litigated. For one thing, the MDL court rejected a proposed
nationwide class action, citing, primarily, the choice-of-law problem.254 Having rejected a nationwide class action, the MDL court
endorsed a bellwether-trial plan. Pursuant to this plan, the court will
hold several representative trials in order to generate information for
possible global settlement.255
The MDL court has also enthusiastically embraced direct filing,
and so have the plaintiffs in the some 8,873 tag-along cases that have
been directly filed into the MDL.256 At the court’s encouragement,
the defendants agreed to a direct-filing case-management order soon
after creation of the MDL.257 By the terms of the order, any plaintiff
whose case would be subject to transfer to the MDL may file directly in
the Southern District of Illinois, and the defendants will not make any
challenge to jurisdiction or venue “for purposes of pretrial proceedings.”258 With respect to choice-of-law, the stipulation proclaims only
that:
The fact that a case was filed directly in the MDL Proceedings pursuant to this Order will have no impact on choice of law, including
the statute of limitations that otherwise would apply to an individual
case had it been filed in another district court and transferred to
this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.259

The complications such a proclamation creates are apparent:
there is no way to determine whether direct filing has an “impact” on
choice-of-law without knowing in what state the case would have been
originally filed. It is obvious that the court’s intention was to ensure
that direct filing did not change the governing law of any individual
plaintiff’s claims, but this stipulation could not have that effect without providing some means for defining what that law would be absent
direct filing.
254 Plaisance v. Bayer Corp., 275 F.R.D 270, 276 (S.D. Ill. 2011) (holding the class
could not be certified “because governing choice of law principles require application
of the substantive laws of the fifty states and the District of Columbia—laws which vary
amongst the jurisdictions”).
255 See Amended Case Management Order No. 24 Bellwether Trial Selection Plan,
In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md02100-DRH-PMF, MDL No. 2100 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2010).
256 See Letter from Catlin Fischer to the author, Managing Clerk, In re Yasmin,
MDL No. 2100 (Aug. 9, 2012) (on file with author).
257 Fourth Amended Case Management Order No. 9, In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg.,
Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, MDL No. 2100,
at 2 (S.D. Ill. March 19, 2012).
258 Id. at 2.
259 Id. at 2–3.
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These problems became unavoidable as the case progressed and
the court had to resolve choice-of-law issues related to attorney-client
privilege. In particular, the court was called upon to decide choice-oflaw problems related to documents both parties claimed were protected by attorney-client privilege.260 Under Federal Rule of Evidence
501, when “[s]tate law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege . . .
shall be determined in accordance with state law.”261 The acknowledgement, however, that state law governs questions of privilege did
not resolve the question of which state’s privilege law should govern in
an individual case when “there are factual connections to more than
one state.”262 To answer that question, the court would have to “apply
state choice of law rules to determine which state’s privilege law
controls.”263
The court began by noting the Klaxon/Van Dusen rule, that a
“transferee court applies the choice of law rules of the state in which
the transferor court sits.”264 Then the court recognized the problem
created by direct filing: “There is no controlling authority . . . with
regard to cases that (1) are directly filed in an MDL pursuant to a
direct filing order and (2) originated outside of the MDL court’s judicial district.”265 The court termed this category of cases “foreign
direct filed cases.”266
Unlike other courts that have considered the question, the Yaz
court rejected the position that Klaxon required that Illinois choice-oflaw rules apply to these cases.267 Instead, the court continued, “the
governing choice of law rules will depend on each case’s source of origin” because the parties had agreed that direct filing would “not
impact the choice of law that otherwise would apply to the direct filed
actions.”268 As a result, the court decided that:
260 In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:90–md–02100–DRH–PMF, 2011 WL 1375011, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011).
261 FED. R. EVID. 501, 2011 WL 1375011 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011) (repealed 2011).
Regarding the history of the privilege rule, see Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics,
and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1710–11 (2004). Legislative history reveals that Rule 501 was a Congressional decision not required by Erie,
and Klaxon does not necessarily control, though courts have applied the Klaxon rule.
The Yaz court’s application of Klaxon illustrates well the choice-of-law problems created by direct filing.
262 In re Yasmin and Yaz, 2011 WL 1375011, at *4.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at *5.
267 See id. at *2.
268 Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
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[T]he better approach is to treat foreign direct filed cases as if they
were transferred from a judicial district sitting in the state where the
case originated. For purposes of this analysis, the Court considers
the originating state to be the state where the plaintiff purchased
and was prescribed the subject drug.”269

As a result, the court held that it must therefore “look to state choice
of law principles . . . . applicable in all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico.270
Given this holding, it is surprising, then, that the court concluded
that “section 139 of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws,”
which typically applies the law of the state where a communication was
made, “will apply to privilege matters governed by state law in this
MDL.”271 In other words, after deciding that it must apply the choiceof-law rules of every state, the court held that every state would adopt
section 139 of the Second Restatement as its choice-of-law rule for
attorney-client privilege. In support of this conclusion, the court
noted that a majority of states that have done so have tended to adopt
the Second Restatement approach. As for the courts that have not
adopted the Second Restatement’s rule for privilege, many either had
adopted the Second Restatement in other areas or “apply an interest
based analysis that reflects the principles underlying section 139 of the
Second Restatement.”272 The court also concluded that the thirteen
states that adhere to the First Restatement would adopt the Second
Restatement for privilege conflicts.
These conclusions are likely incorrect. States following the First
Restatement apply forum law with respect to privilege,273 and they
269 Id. at *6. To illustrate, “for a foreign direct filed member action involving a
plaintiff that purchased and was prescribed the subject drug in Tennessee, the Court
will treat that plaintiff’s claims as if they were transferred to this MDL from a district
court in Tennessee.” Id.
270 Id. at *8.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 The First Restatement denominates rules of evidence as procedural and therefore governed by forum law. JOSEPH H. BEALE, 3 A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 597.1, at 1614 (1935) (“The rule that admissibility of evidence is to be governed by the law of the forum is . . . obviously necessary.”). See also Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 728 (1988) (including privileges among “a host of other matters generally treated as procedural under conflicts law”); Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 122 (2002) (“Courts adhering to . . . the First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws tend to apply the privilege law of the forum state.”).
The classic example is Doll v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 138 Fed. 705, 710 (3d Cir. 1905)
(applying forum law denying privilege even though the state where the communication was made would have protected the communication). For a more recent interpretation of choice-of-law rules relating to privilege in a First Restatement state, see
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would be unlikely to depart from the First Restatement solely for privilege issues.274 And the notion that all other “modern” states would
adopt the Second Restatement rule is oversimplified because modern
approaches differ from one another.275 It is, moreover, odd that the
court would say so much about the need to respect different states’
choice-of-law rules and then decide that those rules are the same for
every state. Furthermore, it doesn’t appear that the court has much
simplified its task—the court had already taken the time to discern
each state’s choice-of-law rules, and it will still have to do a reasonably
complicated Second Restatement choice-of-law analysis under the
Restatement for every case. Finally, as a practical matter, this move
will undoubtedly affect some results, excluding documents in some
cases when they might otherwise be included, and vice versa, because
privilege laws vary from state to state.276
Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 459 F. Supp. 2d 462, 466 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“[T]he law of
privilege, absent an applicable statute, is governed by procedural or lex fori rules.”).
See also Union Planters Nat’l Bank v. ABC Records, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 472, 473 (W.D.
Tenn. 1979) (“Rule 501 requires a district court exercising diversity jurisdiction to
apply the law of privilege which would be applied by the courts of the state in which it
sits.”). This orthodoxy was challenged in the 1950s. See Jack B. Weinstein, Recognition
in the United States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 541
(1956). Then-Professor Weinstein, though, professed no doubt that under the First
Restatement the forum’s privilege law applied. Id. at 544, 549.
274 See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & DONALD THEODORE TRAUTMAN, THE LAW
OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 208, 621–22 (1965) (discussing difference in approach to
privilege between traditional and modern choice-of-law).
275 See, e.g., HAY ET AL., supra note 31, § 2.14, at 64 (“The [Second Restatement]
test consists of multiple and diverse factors that, by themselves, will not enable a court
to make a choice because they are not listed in any order of priority.” (footnote
omitted)).
276 See Glynn, supra note 273, at 60 (“The law of privilege varies greatly from state
to state, federal circuit to federal circuit, and context to context.”); see also Stewart E.
Sterk, Testimonial Privileges: An Analysis of Horizontal Choice of Law Problems, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 461, 461–62 (1977) (“The diversity of state rules regarding testimonial privileges
has fostered several interesting and significant choice of law problems.”). For example, assume a plaintiff domiciled in Virginia who travels to Washington, D.C., where
her doctor prescribes Yaz. That plaintiff purchases Yaz in a Washington pharmacy
and travels home to Virginia, where she suffers a Yaz-related injury. Virginia follows
traditional, First Restatement principles; Washington follows the Second Restatement.
See generally SYMEONIDES, supra note 35, at 64 (charting the choice-of-law methodologies with respect to torts and contracts for all fifty states). If our plaintiff filed her case
at home in Virginia, she would likely get the benefit of Virginia privilege law because
the First Restatement considers privilege a procedural issue governed by forum law.
See Hatfill, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 462. By directly filing her case in the Yaz MDL, pursuant
to the court’s ruling, as a “foreign direct filed case,” the choice-of-law rules of the
jurisdiction where she was prescribed the drug would apply—in this case, Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. would apply the privilege law of the state with the most
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Although much could be said about just the specific privilege
issues involved here, what’s most pertinent for this discussion is the
court’s conclusion that the direct-filing plaintiffs’ cases will be subject
to the choice-of-law rules of the state of purchase. The court admirably exposes and grapples with the problems of direct filing and choice
of law, and by not reflexively applying the letter of Klaxon, the court
takes an important first step toward preserving the choice-of-law
advantages of multidistrict litigation. Moreover, in recognizing that
direct filing creates a magnet forum for cases that would otherwise not
be filed there, the court recognized that direct filing can potentially
change the law governing individual cases. But departing from the
Klaxon rule left a vacuum, and the court made two mistakes in filling
it—first in choosing to apply the choice-of-law rules of the state of
purchase, and second, with respect to privilege, assuming that every
state’s choice-of-law rules would be the same.
The court, therefore, asked the right questions, but came to problematic answers. The problems began with the direct-filing stipulation
itself. The court intended, consistent with Van Dusen, to ensure that
direct filing did not affect any party’s substantive rights by changing

significant relationship with the communication, because the Second Restatement
tends to follow the privilege law of the state where the communication occurred.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §139 cmt. e (1986) (“The state which
has the most significant relationship with a communication will usually be the state
where the communication took place . . . .”).
To keep things simple, let’s assume that a Bayer employee, who works in its Pennsylvania home office, sends an email to one of its attorneys based in Philadelphia that
could be construed as seeking business or legal advice—a borderline privilege call.
Under the Second Restatement, Pennsylvania privilege law would determine whether
the communication is privileged; if the case were filed in Virginia, Virginia privilege
law would apply, pursuant to the First Restatement.
The difference matters. Pennsylvania’s attorney-client privilege is significantly
stronger than most other states because “Pennsylvania is one of the few jurisdictions
in which the burden of proof is on the party challenging the assertion of the privilege.” Agster v. Barmada, 43 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 370 n.8 (C.P. Allegheny Cnty. 1999).
“Pennsylvania has a stronger attorney-client privilege than the privilege recognized in
those jurisdictions that use a balancing approach.” Id. at 370. Virginia, on the other
hand, places the burden of proof on the party seeking to assert the privilege. Va.
Elec. & Power Co. v. Westmoreland–LG & E Partners, 526 S.E.2d 750, 755 (Va. 2000).
The burden of persuasion matters to the results of privilege decisions, and one could
imagine a document admitted under Virginia law that would be excluded under
Pennsylvania law. See PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 11.9, at 976 (1993) (“In many instances this burden will be insurmountable”). As a
result, the court’s decision to ascribe choice-of-law rules of the state where the drug
was prescribed could make a significant difference in the outcome.
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the applicable choice-of-law rules in any case.277 But there is no mechanism to determine what choice-of-law rules would have applied to
each individual case but for direct filing. Here, without such an antecedent choice of forum by each plaintiff, the court was forced to substitute another set of choice-of-law rules: the state where the plaintiff
“purchased and was prescribed the . . . drug.”278 The court’s selection
of the state of purchase seems somewhat arbitrary. The court could
just as easily have chosen the state where the injury occurred, the
plaintiff was domiciled, or ingested the drug. The court’s solution
therefore fails in its goal of not changing the substantive rights of any
party, is unconnected with the policy goals of Klaxon and Van Dusen,
and creates a federal common law overlay on state choice-of-law rules.
In sum, the court recognized the problem with its direct-filing stipulation, and attempted to solve it by imposing its own choice-of-law
rules.279
Although the court’s specific privilege decision is noteworthy, the
bigger impact of the court’s holding will likely be felt beyond privilege
in the tort and products-liability laws applicable to each case. The
court’s decision to apply the choice-of-law rules of the state where the
drug was purchased could have far-reaching effects when the court
decides dispositive motions or tries cases. The court’s decision was, in
a sense, good rough justice: products-liability plaintiffs can always file
cases where the product was purchased, and those states have an interest in applying their substantive law to the conduct. By the metric of
the Klaxon policies, the Yaz ruling is therefore an improvement. But
the ruling falls on the other horn of the choice-of-law problem: changing the law potentially applicable to the case due to the mass-tort proceeding. Whatever one might think about forum shopping, to change
277 In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:09–md–02100–DRH–PMF, 2011 WL 1375011, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011).
278 Id. at *6.
279 This approach is beginning to spread. For instance, in the massive MDL
involving the drug Avandia, comprising over 4,500 cases, the judge recently held, following Yaz, that direct-filed cases “should be governed by the law of the states where
[p]laintiffs received treatment and prescriptions for Avandia.” In re Avandia Mktg,
Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07–MD–01871, 2012 WL 3205620, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2012). Setting aside the potential problems of an order requiring
that claims be governed by the laws of multiple states in which plaintiffs received
prescriptions, the order replicates the problem of applying choice-of-law rules
divorced from the plaintiffs’ choice of forum without prior notice. In this case, the
court ruled that the statutes of limitations of the places where the plaintiffs were
treated applied, barring claims under the laws of those states which might have been
valid under the laws of other states where the plaintiffs might have chosen to file. Id.
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the rules in the middle of the game is unfair—if a plaintiff files
directly in an MDL, she at least ought to know what she is getting.280
For instance, any plaintiff who might have filed in a state following traditional choice-of-law rules could see a different tort law
applied through a change of the choice-of-law rules to the state where
the product was purchased. Consider this example: assume a plaintiff
lives in Delaware, but near the Maryland border. She visits her Delaware doctor, who prescribes Yaz, and she fills the prescription at a
Delaware pharmacy near her home. The plaintiff, however, works
across the border in Maryland. While at work one day, she suffers a
heart attack, which she alleges is due to her use of Yaz.
Maryland and Delaware have different choice-of-law rules and
substantive tort laws, but jurisdiction and venue are appropriate in
both states. With respect to choice of law, Maryland adheres strictly to
the First Restatement and steadfastly applies the tort law of the state of
the injury,281 while Delaware subscribes to the more flexible Second
Restatement, which considers the place of the injury as only one factor among several considerations in deciding what state’s tort law to
apply.282 With respect to tort law, Maryland is significantly more
plaintiff-friendly in the sense that it recognizes a claim for strict products liability.283 Delaware, conversely, has rejected strict liability;
plaintiffs are limited to claims in negligence and breach of
warranty.284
Where the plaintiff sues makes a big difference. If she sues in
Maryland, the court will apply Maryland law because the injury
occurred there.285 Under Maryland law, she can maintain a claim for
280 The Supreme Court has recognized that plaintiffs often select the forum for
choice-of-law reasons. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981).
281 See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Heffernan, 925 A.2d 636, 648–49 (Md. 2007) (“Maryland
law is clear that in a conflict of law situation . . . ‘where the events giving rise to a tort
action occur in more than one State, we apply the law of the State where the injury[—
]the last event required to constitute the tort[—]occurred.’ ” (quoting Lab. Corp. of
Am. v. Hood, 911 A.2d 841, 845 (Md. 2006)). See also Lab. Corp. of Am., 911 A.2d at
845 (“Maryland continues to adhere generally to the lex loci delicti principle in tort
cases.”).
282 See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 47 (Del. 1991).
283 See Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976).
284 See Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 974 (Del. 1980). See also
DiIenno v. Libbey Glass Div., Owens-Illinois, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 373, 376 (D. Del. 1987)
(“Delaware does not recognize the doctrine of strict products liability . . . .”).
285 The court would deem the injury to have occurred in Maryland because, under
First Restatement principles, the injury occurs at the “place where the injury was suffered, not where the wrongful act took place.” Philip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 752
A.2d 200, 231 (Md. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). See also ROBERT A. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 133, at 267 (3d ed. 1977) (“The orthodox rule . . . is that
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strict liability.286 But if the plaintiff were to sue in Delaware, the court
would probably apply Delaware tort law, because, under the Second
Restatement, the court would be unlikely to apply the law of the place
of the injury when the plaintiff lived, consumed, bought, and was prescribed Yaz in another state.287 The court would consider place of the
injury a “fortuity.”288 Assuming competent representation, the plaintiff would file her case in Maryland, where she could advance a strictliability claim.
Now assume that our plaintiff direct-filed her case into the Yaz
MDL pursuant to the direct-filing stipulation, which purported to
have “no effect” on the applicable substantive law. Under the court’s
decision, her case would be deemed a “foreign direct filed case,”
which would be subject to the choice-of-law rules of the state where
the drug was prescribed, in this case Delaware. By direct filing, she
would unexpectedly be stuck with Delaware law, and no longer have
the benefit of a strict-liability claim. Setting aside one’s views on the
propriety of the plaintiff’s ability to select from otherwise proper
forums and the “correct” choice-of-law analysis, it is clear that the
court’s direct-filing ruling would change the substantive law applicable in certain cases in midstream.
The Yaz court’s decision, therefore, avoids the problem of inappropriate application of the Klaxon rule, but it runs afoul of the Van
Dusen principle that mere inclusion in a mass-tort proceeding in federal court should not change the substantive law applicable to a plaintiff’s case. Moreover, in essentially adopting a federal choice-of-law
rule with respect to privilege, the Yaz court ran afoul of the other
when an act operates across a state line its legal character is determined by the law of
the place where it first takes harmful effect or produces the result complained of.”).
286 See Phipps, 363 A.2d at 963.
287 See Thompson v. Reinco, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01C–04–076JRJ, 2004 WL 1426971, at
*2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 15, 2004) (applying Delaware law rejecting strict-productsliability claim when plaintiff suffered injury while working in Maryland because “the
place of injury was fortuitous, the relationship between all the parties is predominantly centered on the delivery and intended use in Delaware”). See also McBride v.
Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., No. C.A. 91C–01–179, 1993 WL 489487 (Del. Super.
Ct. Oct. 21, 1993) aff’d, 645 A.2d 568 (Del. 1994) (reversing lower-court application
of Maryland law when only the injury occurred there, but the plaintiff lived and
worked in Delaware).
288 Cervantes v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire Co., C.A. No. 07C–06–249 JRJ,
2010 WL 431788, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2008) (“The place of injury is considered to be fortuitous when there is no other significant contact with the site other
than the injury itself.”). See also Rasmussen v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., No.
93C–04–058, 1995 WL 945556, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1995) (“In deciding
choice of law, Delaware courts apply the ‘most significant relationship’ test.”).
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underlying Klaxon principle: that state choice-of-law rules are substantive law from which a federal court may not depart, at least while Congress has remained silent.
IV. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
No current court’s approach to direct filing and choice of law is
satisfactory. This is understandable, both due to the inherent tension
between mass-tort litigation and choice of law, and the underlying
complexity and incoherence of federal personal-jurisdiction and
choice-of law doctrine. Following the letter of Klaxon and applying
the choice-of-law rules of the MDL state to the potentially thousands
of direct-filed cases is inconsistent with the policy underpinnings of
both Klaxon and Van Dusen. But recognizing that following the
Klaxon rule is problematic leaves a vacuum, one which the Yaz court
filled by selecting choice-of-law rules without regard to the plaintiffs’
choice of forum—a move also inconsistent with Klaxon and Van
Dusen. This problem demonstrates how direct filing’s attempts to consolidate more cases seamlessly in an MDL create complicated choiceof-law problems.
One solution to the dilemma might be to prohibit direct filing.
This seems wrong, though, particularly when it would be preferable to
preserve the efficiency benefits of direct filing to all parties and to
reduce the pressures on the JPML as MDL becomes more prominent.
As a procedural innovation, direct filing should be applauded, so long
as any distorting downstream effects can be mitigated. Moreover, banning direct filing would be a rather extreme move, not only due to its
popularity and efficacy, but also because personal jurisdiction and
venue have long been deemed waivable defenses.289 And, as the MDL
process becomes more dominant, and transfer of tag-along cases into
MDLs remains essentially a formality, there seems to be little reason
not to streamline the procedure so long as the issues embedded in the
choice-of-law problem can be ironed out.290 Indeed, accommodating
innovations like direct filing while also preserving competing litigation values ought to be a goal in developing hybrid aggregate-litigation schemes. Preserving direct filing as a practice, though, squarely
presents the problems of what choice-of-law rules to apply to the
direct-filed cases, and where to transfer the direct-filed cases should
pretrial proceedings conclude.
289 See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
704 (1982) (noting personal jurisdiction can be waived).
290 See Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 22, at 2357 n.16 (extolling some of the
benefits of direct filing).
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In my view, the best solution would be to require a direct-filing
MDL plaintiff to declare in the complaint an appropriate “home
venue” where the case could have otherwise been filed.291 The MDL
court should then apply the choice-of-law rules of the state where the
case would otherwise have been filed, assuming that it is an appropriate venue. The benefit of this approach is that it would make direct
filing neutral as to the choice-of-law rules that would otherwise
apply—that is, do what the Yaz court was trying to do, but failed to
accomplish. To do so would avoid replicating in MDL many of the
complicated choice-of-law problems that plagued the class action.
Ultimately, this solution would be straightforward in future cases, but
could likely also be applied retroactively in currently pending MDLs
by requiring plaintiffs to amend their complaints to include a proper
home venue. Courts currently overseeing MDLs could enshrine
choice-of-law neutrality as the rule in case-management orders.292
Should defendants wish to challenge the plaintiff’s chosen “home
venue” for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, courts should establish a procedure that allows defendants to do so before answering the
complaint, in a process akin to an objection under Rules 12(b)(2) or
12(b)(3).293
This approach is consistent with the structure of MDL, which proclaims to be an aggregation procedure that does not fundamentally
291 One court has experimented with such a direct-filing order, but did not
address the choice-of-law implications. In allowing direct filing, the court required
the plaintiffs “to specify the proper venue of origin, as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.”
Pretrial Order No. 37, In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
07–1873, at 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2009). In other words, the court required the plaintiffs
to specify the proper “venue of origin” to which the cases could be transferred at the
close of pretrial proceedings. The order, however, says nothing about choice of law.
When the problem eventually did arise, when the cases were set to be transferred to
other districts, the court expressly refused to comment on the choice-of-law implications of direct filing, stating that “[t]he plaintiffs knew when they directly filed these
claims in this [c]ourt that such direct filing could potentially affect their substantive
rights[,]” but “the [c]ourt expressly makes no comment as to . . . the effect of such
filing,” leaving the transferee court to sort it out. In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 07–1873, 2012 WL 1580761, at *1 (E.D. La. May 4, 2012).
292 Defendants in these cases might challenge such an amendment, but courts will
likely be within their power to effect the change because this is an issue of first impression in nearly all courts, and this approach is more consistent with the MDL statutory
file-and-transfer scheme.
293 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), (3). Although such objections might add a layer of
process, MDL courts would be well equipped to issue decisions signaling the scope of
jurisdiction to potential tag-along plaintiffs, similar to how MDL courts currently
operate with respect to similar procedural issues, such as remand motions or fraudulent joinder.
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change the character of the cases within it. Moreover, this solution is
more consistent with the policies of Klaxon and Van Dusen than simply
applying the letter of the Klaxon rule, and better avoids the problems
associated with the “disinterested third state.”294 First, the choice-oflaw rules that apply would not be different from those that might
apply were the MDL not to exist; rather the choice-of-law rules of a
state where the action might have been brought individually will
apply. This is consistent with Klaxon and Erie in that diversity jurisdiction will not change the choice-of-law rules otherwise applicable to a
plaintiff’s case.
Second, a forum where personal jurisdiction and venue lie over
the defendants is more likely to be sufficiently connected with the
case to have an interest in applying its own law to the dispute. Unlike
some nationwide class actions and MDLs where the lion’s share of
cases are direct-filed,295 the otherwise-proper individual forums where
the cases are filed would be more likely to have constitutionally adequate contacts to assert legislative jurisdiction and apply their own
laws to the case.296 Whether that forum decides that its own law ought
to apply to the case before it is a matter of state policy, as reflected in
its choice-of-law rules—and it is this decision that is appropriately worthy of respect under Klaxon.297 Taking this approach avoids replicating a problem common in nationwide class actions: leaving the
decision of which law to apply to every plaintiff’s case with only one
state, applying one set of choice-of-law rules.
294 See supra Part III.A.
295 See Andrews, supra note 238, at 1331; Wood, supra note 238, at 623.
296 See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 59–60 (1986)
(explaining the impact of Shutts and the limits of a forum’s legislative jurisdiction in
class actions).
297 See Cavers, Changing Choice-of-Law Process, supra note 11, at 736. The relationship between personal jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction is complicated—they
are almost certainly not co-extensive. Of course, it is possible that there might be
personal jurisdiction, even though there is not legislative jurisdiction—that is, a state
might be able to assert jurisdiction over the defendant but not be able to apply its own
law. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981). MDL, however, exacerbates this problem—a result my solution seeks to prevent. Whether a state has legislative jurisdiction strikes me as a slightly different question from whether that state may
apply its choice-of-law rules to a given dispute. Fully examining the implications of
this distinction is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is an open question. One
thing this paper seeks to accomplish is to begin a discussion of personal jurisdiction
and choice of law in an era of MDL ascendancy. See Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183,
2184 (1997); Earl M. Maltz, Visions of Fairness—The Relationship Between Jurisdiction and
Choice-of-Law, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 751, 751 (1988).
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Third, such an approach is consistent with Van Dusen in that the
plaintiff’s inclusion in a mass-tort proceeding within the federal system will neither change the law, nor deprive the plaintiff of the forum
choice he otherwise would have made, knowing the choice-of-law
implications.298 Ultimately, a plaintiff’s participation in an aggregated
litigation should not alone change that plaintiff’s substantive rights.299
Although plaintiffs will still have a choice among forums—sometimes
numerous forums—ensuring that there is not an additional possible
set of choice-of-law rules available through direct filing means that any
forum-shopping concerns linked to a plaintiff’s venue privilege at
least will not be exacerbated.300 In other words, unlike creating a new
set of choice-of-law rules for the federal courts, or offering a state
forum that would otherwise be unavailable, this approach has no
unique effect on forum shopping over a one-on-one litigation.
As a doctrinal matter, this approach is feasible, even though it
would be an exception to the letter of the Klaxon rule. One might
object that as long as Klaxon is on the books, MDL courts have no
business departing from it, even if departing from the letter of the
rule better preserves the policies underlying it.301 This argument is
powerful in light of Congress’s persistent refusal to change the Klaxon
rule in the context of mass torts and class actions.302 But while it is
true that the Klaxon rule remains solid in both the Supreme Court
and Congress, direct filing is the appropriate situation for creating an
298 See Trangsrud, supra note 182, at 86 (arguing that “[t]he evident purpose” of
Van Dusen is “to avoid any impact on the likely outcome of the case due to the change
of venue”).
299 See Kramer, supra note 4, at 578; Silberman, supra note 4, at 2034 (“The procedural tools of aggregation should not distort the underlying substantive rights of the
parties. Courts should approach choice of law as they would in the paradigm individual case.”). My suggestion would also pair well with Congress revisiting the general
transfer statute and Ferens to ensure that in cases where there is expansive personal
jurisdiction, direct filing does not further entice plaintiffs to select the choice-of-law
rules of the MDL forum and then seek to have the case transferred to a more convenient forum for trial. That said, my solution at least does not make the Ferens problem worse.
300 See Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 1623, 1646–47 (1992) (arguing that federal choice-of-law rules create an
incentive for vertical forum shopping, in that “[f]ederalized choice-of-law standards,
in the absence of federalized state choice-of-law, are a return to Swift—vintage forumshopping opportunities” (footnote omitted)); Sedler, supra note 137, at 861.
301 Indeed, this is the argument many scholars make when rejecting federal common law choice-of-law rules in mass torts. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 4, at 577 (“Congress should not overrule Klaxon.”).
302 See Silberman, supra note 4, at 2031 (“Congress has allowed the choice of law
consequences to fall where they may.”).
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exception by interpreting the MDL statute to require an antecedent
choice of proper venue when direct filing.303
Indeed, such an exception to Klaxon pursuant to a federal procedural statute would not be unprecedented: Van Dusen was just such an
exception. Strict application of the Klaxon rule in transfer cases
would require the transferee court to apply the choice-of-law rules of
the state in which it sits. Van Dusen interpreted the transfer statute to
create an exception to the Klaxon rule on the ground that, assuming
the original choice of forum was proper, a plaintiff’s rights should not
be affected by the use of a transfer device available only in the federal
system.304 A similar exception would be appropriate here, and consistent with Van Dusen and the MDL statute. Indeed, the MDL statute
was designed to be a purely administrative device, not change the substantive law applicable to any component case. Ensuring that direct
filing does not have that effect is consistent with the statute.
Support for my proposed framework may also be found in a similar exception courts have made to the Van Dusen rule when a case is
originally filed in an improper venue and is transferred to a proper
one under 28 U.S.C. §1406(a). In such a case, where the original
venue is not one that would otherwise be authorized (because either
venue or personal jurisdiction is inappropriate), the Van Dusen rule
does not apply, and the transferee court is free to apply its own
choice-of-law rules.305 This line of cases confirms that an otherwise
improper forum has no purchase on its choice-of-law rules applying to
a given case.
The improper-venue analogy is not, however, a perfect one,
because in direct filing the plaintiffs have agreed to file in the MDL
court, and the defendants have, at least for purposes of pretrial proceedings, consented to jurisdiction there—in that sense, at least, the
venue is proper. It is going too far, though, to say that consent to
jurisdiction in the MDL court ought to be considered equivalent to
consent to that state’s choice-of-law rules, particularly in the current
climate, where a rule has not yet been established and direct-filing
303 Such a solution would also have the benefit of ensuring that the case had a
proper venue to return should pretrial proceedings come to a close, or the plaintiff
was not interested in agreeing to a negotiated global settlement.
304 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S 612, 637–39 (1964).
305 See Gerena v. Korb, 617 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2010) (“If a district court
receives a case pursuant to a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), for improper venue,
or 28 U.S.C. § 1631, for want of jurisdiction, it logically applies the law of the state in
which it sits, since the original venue, with its governing laws, was never a proper
option.”); Eggleton v. Plasser & Theurer Exp. Von Bahnbaumaschinen Gesellschaft,
MBH, 495 F.3d 582, 588–89 (8th Cir. 2007).
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orders purport to have no effect of choice of law. At the very least,
establishing a baseline rule would prevent unfair surprise to parties
who, quite reasonably in cases like Yaz, expected that direct filing
would not change their substantive rights. If nothing else, a plaintiff
who is direct filing, and a defendant who agrees to the practice, ought
to know what the effect will be. It is untenable for case-management
orders to continue to state that direct filing will have no effect on
choice of law when it is now clear that is not the case.
Also, courts could easily adopt the neutrality rule as part of a casemanagement order establishing direct filing. There is nothing in
Klaxon that would bar an MDL court crafting a direct-filing stipulation
to require that the choice-of-law rules of the state where the action
would otherwise have been filed should apply. If nothing else, the Yaz
case and the numerous other large current MDLs involving direct-filing stipulations demonstrate that the time has come for a baseline
rule resolving the question of what state’s choice-of-law rules apply to
direct-filed cases. In Yaz, the lack of a defined rule led to a potential
change in the governing law in many cases, despite the direct-filing
stipulation’s stated goal of having no effect on choice of law.306 Going
forward, there should be a rule that allows parties to decide effectively
whether to take advantage of a direct-filing stipulation. If uncertainty
persists, plaintiffs may forgo direct filing in order to ensure the application of their preferred set of choice-of-law rules, preventing the full
benefit of the direct-filing process. One virtue of my proposed solution is that it delinks direct filing from choice of law—that is, direct
filing does not have any choice-of-law impact. This approach is not
only consistent with the view of MDL as a collection of otherwise independent actions but also consistent with Klaxon and Van Dusen.
Given, however, that direct filing is instituted by case-management orders to which defendants must stipulate, a reasonable next
question might be whether MDL courts should allow parties to stipulate to different arrangements in direct-filing orders, or whether a different rule would be preferable. As a doctrinal matter, there is
nothing that would currently prevent MDL courts from allowing such
different arrangements.307 Certainly, case-management orders that
306 In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:90–md–02100–DRH–PMF, 2011 WL 1375011, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011).
307 Such an arrangement has been stipulated to in the MDL involving the Yamaha
Rhino all-terrain vehicle. The parties included in the direct-filing stipulation that
direct filed cases would be governed by the choice-of-law rules of the place of the
injury or the place of plaintiff’s domicile—at the election of the plaintiff. Case Management and Scheduling Order No. 2, In re Yamaha Motor Corp. Rhino ATV Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2016, No. 3:09–MD–2016–JBC, at 1 (W.D. Ky. Jul. 27, 2009). In
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specify the choice-of-law rules to be applied to direct-filed cases—
whatever they might be—would be a significant improvement over
orders that say nothing about choice of law, and therefore risk unfair
surprise to plaintiffs, as in Yaz. If the applicable choice-of-law rules
were specified, the plaintiff would know in advance the effects of
direct filing and could choose not to do it.308
But there are reasons courts should be wary of establishing a
direct-filing procedure that strays from choice-of-law neutrality. First,
direct filing is a beneficial innovation for all parties and the courts in
terms of administration of the MDL. Its availability should not
depend on the particularities of a given case or the rules of the state
in which the MDL is established. One could imagine defendants—
who agree to institute the practice before the thousands of additional
tag-along cases are filed—stipulating only to choice-of-law rules especially advantageous to them as part of direct filing. Moreover, one
could imagine plaintiffs facing the decision of whether to exchange
otherwise beneficial choice-of-law rules for the benefits of direct filing,
a problem which persists in class actions, particularly when there is a
possibility that lawyers would prefer administrative simplicity.309
There is also the possibility that such a non-neutral agreement would
general, courts would be better off preferring my proposed solution because it complies best with the Van Dusen policy of ensuring that inclusion in a mass tort litigation
is choice-of-law neutral, and does not present a risk that plaintiffs will face a choice
between administrative simplicity and beneficial law. In the Rhino litigation, in order
for plaintiffs to get the benefit of direct filing they must give up the choice-of-law rules
of other possible forums, such as the home state of the defendant. As a matter of
disclosure, I was part of the team representing Yamaha in the Rhino litigation and first
became interested in these issues then.
308 One could object that my proposed solution is not neutral as between a oneon-one litigation and an aggregated litigation because in a one-on-one litigation a
disinterested forum to which the parties have consented will still apply its own choiceof-law rules. This is a potent objection, and it raises the complex problem of what
rules a disinterested forum ought to apply. Indeed, this problem was so knotty that
neither Currie nor Cavers developed a solution they deemed satisfactory. In their
view, the problem was mostly theoretical and rarely came up in practice. See Cavers,
supra note 11, at 737; Currie, supra note 25, at 785. Although this paper does not
suggest an ultimate solution to the problem in one-on-one litigation, I believe that the
appropriate solution, as a matter of choice of law, probably involves renvoi. That is, a
disinterested third state should look to the choice-of-law rules of the interested states
to decide if there is a conflict. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
979, 982–83 (1991) (“To the extent that a foreign system defines the scope of the
foreign state’s law, the court should accept the renvoi.”). Kermit Roosevelt sketches
out a promising approach to the problem, grounded in Klaxon principles. See
ROOSEVELT, supra note 3, at 160.
309 See Trangsrud, supra note 18, at 821 (“The individual plaintiff also runs the risk
that the representative plaintiffs in a class action will elect to proceed on liability theo-
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allow an additional set of choice-of-law rules to apply, which might
unnecessarily create an additional forum-shopping opportunity, for
both sides. In the end, the decision whether to agree to direct filing,
or to choose to directly file a case should not be affected by choice-oflaw considerations.
Beyond potential concerns about distortions, retaining a choiceof-law-neutral approach to direct filing avoids replicating the Klaxonrelated federalism concerns inherent to applying a single set of federal choice-of-law rules to a potentially nationwide set of cases. It is
one thing to say that parties may waive the advantages of an alternative
forum by consenting to jurisdiction in an otherwise unavailable court,
but another to say that parties, with courts’ encouragement, should be
able to override the choice-of-law rules of every other state with a regulatory interest in governing disputes.310 As Cavers recognized, taking
Klaxon seriously requires respect for states’ policy choices when their
laws are potentially implicated in a given dispute.311 The rise of federal aggregate litigation demonstrates that the problem is not purely
theoretical, but it need not be exacerbated if it can be avoided, particularly if the increased prevalence of the problem is created by the
aggregation device itself. That is, the reason the parties are flooding
disinterested forums is because of direct filing. Rather than create an
unnecessary complication, all the better to accommodate the innovation by adopting a neutral and more coherent practice.
Moreover, this solution allows MDL courts to take advantage of
the benefits of direct filing without causing increased choice-of-law
confusion in the administration of cases. There is no doubt that the
Klaxon/Van Dusen system causes a headache for MDL courts, a headache Congress repeatedly refuses to cure by enacting national choiceof-law rules.312 Although different choice-of-law rules, or substantive
laws for that matter, do not prevent aggregation in an MDL, as they
have come to in the class action, they do present managerial problems
for courts.313 That said, these problems do not seem to have inhibited
terribly the effective administration of MDLs—my proposed solution
ries better suited for class treatment at the expense of theories especially favorable to
the individual plaintiff.”); Silberman, supra note 4, at 2030.
310 See Kane, supra note 10 at 320 (“[I]dentifying a single governing law presents a
direct collision between individual state interests and judicial system interests. . . .
[That] may be challenged as inappropriately intrusive on historic federalism interests
and the rights of states to establish and enforce their own policy decisions.”).
311 See supra Part I.B.
312 See Barbara Ann Atwood, The Choice-of-Law Dilemma in Mass Tort Litigation: Kicking Around Erie, Klaxon, and Van Dusen, 19 CONN. L. REV. 9, 19–20 & n.46 (1986).
313 See id. at 11; Kane, supra note 10, at 313.
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does not reduce manageability and preserves the benefits of direct
filing, and state autonomy in choice of law. It is certainly true that any
solution which applies different choice-of-law rules to different cases
requires a tradeoff in terms of manageability, but manageability must
be weighed against other competing values.
Indeed, this solution would not have made the choice-of-law analysis in the Yaz case any more complicated. The Yaz court ultimately
decided that it would have to follow the Second Restatement’s flexible
test with respect to every case in the MDL.314 Assuming the court had
followed this framework from the outset of the case, it would have
been clear what state’s choice-of-law rules applied to the component
cases in the MDL. The solution I advocate would require only the
additional step of determining the choice-of-law rules of the hypothetical state of filing and applying them.315 In deciding matters with
respect to individual cases, there would be no uncertainty. The specific question the Yaz court was dealing with, attorney-client privilege,
creates a set of additional problems, but proper application of the law
that would apply to individual cases leaves the defense no worse off
due to consolidation.
There is also reason to believe that application of the Klaxon/Van
Dusen system will not be a major impediment to the resolution of
MDLs in the era of bellwether trials. In a system where MDL courts
are trying a variety of cases in order to allow the parties to test their
arguments to lay the foundation for global settlement, applications of
choice-of-law rules will occur most in those individual cases. The
Klaxon/Van Dusen framework is a strong fit for those analyses, because
the inclusion of the cases in the MDL does not alter the substantive
law that would otherwise apply.
This is not to say, of course, that choice-of-law rules are of little
significance. Rather, choice-of-law rules not only affect the results of
the bellwether trials, but also the settlement value of the rest of the
cases in the MDL. Even in a globally settled case, parties ought to
know what law applies to claims when deciding whether to accept the
settlement, and to what forum the case will be transferred. And, as
the Yaz case illustrates, there are still numerous occasions when
broader applications of state law are necessary.
In the end, direct filing is a useful innovation that provides efficiencies to all parties and the federal litigation system and should be a
314 In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:90–md–02100–DRH–PMF, 2011 WL 1375011, at *8 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011).
315 This is less of a substantial burden in the age of Westlaw and Dean Symeonides’s fifty-state survey of choice-of-law rules. SYMEONIDES, supra note 35, at 64.
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regularly available feature in MDL, especially as MDL becomes even
more prominent. There is no reason to threaten the benefits of direct
filing by entangling it with choice of law. Making direct filing choiceof-law neutral best preserves these benefits without overcomplicating
MDL procedure or confronting unnecessary choice-of-law difficulties.
CONCLUSION
Multidistrict litigation has largely overtaken the class action as the
primary vehicle for aggregating mass-tort cases in the federal courts.
One significant reason for this shift is that the MDL process can
achieve a high degree of aggregation without pressure to override the
differences in individual cases. Unlike nationwide class actions, which
federal courts have agreed must be governed under a single state’s law
in order to be sufficiently cohesive and manageable to be certified,
MDL allows cases to retain their individual identities within a larger
aggregate litigation. Moreover, MDL relieves the pressure to resolve
every case within the aggregate under a single state’s choice-of-law
rules. This shift is an improvement as a matter of choice of law, federalism, and litigant autonomy, without creating an unbearable loss in
efficiency. In sum, the fact that an MDL can be “choice-of-law-neutral” with respect to each individual plaintiff represents an advance,
and demonstrates how hybrid approaches to aggregation like MDL
can effectively accommodate competing litigation values.
As this paper has illustrated, however, this balance is tenuous—
with overemphasis on efficiency comes potential increased confusion
in choice of law. One example of this has been the uncertain choiceof-law implications of the increasingly prevalent practice of direct filing in MDL. This practice, which affects thousands of cases in some of
the largest currently pending litigations in the country, presents
troubling practical and conceptual choice-of-law problems. Courts
have divided as to the appropriate solution, and no current approach
is satisfactory. Ultimately, direct filing is an innovation beneficial to
all parties and the MDL system. Courts ought to ensure the benefits
of direct filing by delinking the practice from choice of law. To do
this, courts should require direct-filing plaintiffs to declare an appropriate home forum in which the case would otherwise have been filed,
and to which it would be transferred should pretrial proceedings conclude. The MDL court should apply the choice-of-law rules of this
declared home forum to the plaintiff’s case. This solution is both possible and workable and ought to be adopted by MDL courts in both
pending and future litigations. By making direct filing choice-of-law
neutral, MDL courts can prevent the distortions direct filing currently
causes while preserving the benefits of this procedural innovation.

